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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent Great Recession soiled the credit reports of many Americans.
Furthermore, advances in database technology have allowed employers and others
wider access to comprehensive information about consumers, sometimes significantly
narrowing the opportunities those consumers might have for employment, credit,
housing, or insurance. These results have inspired some state legislatures to revise their
credit reporting statutes to ameliorate the percussive effects of the economic crisis on
their citizens’ credit records. However, state lawmakers must navigate the thicket of the
federal Fair Credit Reporting Act’s preemption provisions if they are to create legislation
that will be effective rather than impotent. This article analyzes these provisions
alongside recent Supreme Court decisions about preemption. The article then provides
both a theory of the intersection of state and federal credit reporting laws and describes
the space remaining for state legislatures to create preemption-proof, or at least
preemption-resistant, credit reporting provisions that can fairly balance the concerns of
individuals and those who want access to their background information.
Below, Part II describes some recent legislative efforts in protecting consumers’
financial and criminal record information. Following, Part III describes the framework
of federal preemption generally, and analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent preemption
decisions that are relevant to these information protection laws. Part IV describes the
Fair Credit Reporting Act’s provisions that may overlap state legislative activity, along
with its specific preemption provisions, and analyzes the vulnerability of various state
credit reporting provisions to preemption. The article then maps out strategies for states
to employ to preemption-proof their legislation, offering survival strategies for states to
use to maximize the effects of their state information-protection laws.
II.

STATES’ REGULATION OF DISCLOSURE OF
CONSUMER FINANCIAL AND CRIMINAL RECORD INFORMATION

Nearly every state regulates how consumers’ financial and criminal record
information may be collected and disclosed; these are, in essence, reputation-protecting
provisions. However, given recent developments in the economy and data technology,
this may be a suitable time to adjust these laws to better balance the privacy interests of
consumers against the information interests of employers, banks, and insurance
companies.
The Great Recession inflicted tremendous damage to credit records by causing
widespread unemployment and depressing housing values, putting great stress on the
ability of many to repay debts.1 Those defaults and delays in payment have been duly
1

A study by the Fair Isaac Corporation concluded that about 50,000,000 people
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amassed by the consumer reporting agencies that publish credit reports about
consumers and compute their credit scores. Employers that see this information may be
less likely to hire those hurt by economic blows, and landlords less likely to rent,
insurers less likely to insure (or be willing to insure, but at elevated premiums).
Aside from the economic environment, advances in data technology have increased
our ability to view public records across the country, leading many to be marked by
visible criminal records incurred even decades ago, records that many might have
thought they’d surpassed.2 In addition, medical costs have continued to accelerate, and
medical debt has not only spoiled many otherwise solid credit reports, but it has also led
to a significant number of bankruptcies.3 Finally, the crime of identity theft has
increased as data breaches have become more common, exposing sensitive financial
information to thieves, who can then poison their victims’ credit reports.4
suffered a decline of more than 20 points in one of the company’s credit score
measures. Rachel Bell, Recession Causes FICO Score Swings, available at
http://bankinganalyticsblog.fico.com/2011/10/recession-causes-fico-scoreswings.html. Credit scores then largely rebounded in the subsequent two years.
Id.; see also Credit Scores Drop During Recession: Are You Worried about Your
Score? (July 12, 2010) (noting that 25% of Americans had a credit score of 599 or
lower, in contrast to a historical norm of 15%), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/WN/credit-scores-drop-millions-americans-recession-worldnews/story?id=11142553; National Employment Law Project, Barriers Facing the

Long-Term Unemployed: Statement of the National Employment Law Project
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions 8

(Dec. 6, 2011) (reporting that bankruptcy filings rose 23% between 2008 and
2010), available at http://www.nelp.org/page//UI/2011/Owens_Testimony_Barriers_Unemployed_12-2011.pdf?nocdn=1; Jeremy
Simon, U.S. Economic Recession Shifted FICO Credit Scores (Sept. 27, 2011)
(showing annual increases in the percent of the population with poor credit scores
from 2006-2009, when they gradually began to improve).
2 See Dara N. Lee, The Digital Scarlet Letter: The Effect of Online Criminal
Records on Crime Figure 1. Timing of Online Criminal Records, 1990-2008 (May
2011) (showing a gradual increase in states making available criminal records
online over the course of 1990-2008, finishing with 25 states).
3 Kate Santich, Bills Can Bankrupt Insured, ORLANDO SENTINEL July 31, 2011 at A1;
Sara R. Collins, Ruth Robertson, Tracy Garber, and Michelle M. Doty, The

Commonwealth Fund, Insuring the Future, Current Trends in Health Coverage and the
Effects of Implementing the Affordable Care Act, "Millions Are Struggling to Pay
Medical Bills,” at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Charts/Report/2012-BiennialSurvey-Insuring-the-Future/Problems-with-Medical-Bills-or-Accrued-Medical-DebtHighest-Among-Adults-with-Low-Moderate-Incomes.aspx (reporting that in 2012 75
million adults struggled with medical debt).
4 See Lisa Gerstner, What You Need to Know About Identity Theft, CHI. TRIB.,
May 19, 2013, at Money & Real Estate; Zone C; p. 12 (reporting that more than
12.6 million people suffered identity theft in 2012, an increase of nearly 8% from
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State legislators can ameliorate the effects of some of these historical events on their
constituents’ opportunities, curbing the impact of old credit, criminal, medical, and
identity theft problems. However, for such record-enhancing provisions to have their
intended impact, the drafters must carefully navigate the express preemption provisions
staked throughout the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the federal statute governing the
creation and use of credit reports.5 Furthermore, drafters must simultaneously consider
the Supreme Court’s present stance on express and implied preemption. Below are
discussed some of the richest opportunities for legislatures to rebalance the interests of
credit report users against the economic recovery of consumers. These include
employers’ use of credit reports, criminal record information, medical debt information,
and identity theft content.
A. Employer Checks of Credit Reports
After creditors themselves, employers may be the most visible and obvious users of
consumer credit reports and similar background checks, reviewing them to peer into the
past financial and other decisions of both current employees and applicants in order to
choose and place their workers. According to a survey by the Society for Human
Resource Management, in 2012 approximately 34 percent of employers said that they
conduct credit background checks on some potential applicants, and another 13 percent
conduct them for all.6
However, such information may unfairly damage an individual’s prospects in a few
ways. First, credit and other background checks can be surprisingly inaccurate; a recent
report by the Federal Trade Commission to Congress disclosed that 21% of credit reports
have some sort of error in them, and 5.2% have one or more serious errors.7 This single
digit rate deceives – when applied against millions of reports, the number of consumers
injured by mendacious reports is disquieting.8 Furthermore, even when a credit report
2011).
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2012). The preemption provisions are found in 15
U.S.C. § 1681t.
6 Soc. for Hum. Res. Mgmt., Background Checking – The Use of Credit
Background Checks in Hiring Decisions (2012), available at
http://www.shrm.org/research/surveyfindings/articles/pages/creditbackgroundche
cks.aspx.
7 Federal Trade Comm’n, Report to Congress under Section 319 of the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (Dec. 2012) (reporting a rate of serious
errors of 5.2%).
8 See Prepared Remarks of Richard Cordray, Director of the Consumer Fin.
Protection Bureau, Credit Reporting Field Hearing (July 16, 2012),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speeches/prepared-remarks-by-richard-cordray-
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is accurate, it may blacklist otherwise qualified and competent candidates from a job if it
incorporates information that may unduly grab the attention of its audience.
Several states perceive such reports to unfairly impede employment, and in response
they have enacted provisions designed to protect employees and job applicants from the
scrutiny of a credit report check. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington have all passed
credit history cloaking measures.9 Guam has also passed such a provision.10 Other states
have considered such provisions though without yet passing them.11
The adopted measures typically prevent employers or others from using a credit
report in offering employment.12 Such restrictions far exceed those imposed by the
FCRA, which permits employers to obtain an employee or applicant’s credit report so
long as the target has consented.13
The history of Maryland’s law is typical; the bill’s sponsor introduced it to assist
“blue-collar workers having trouble making ends meet, so that they don’t have one more
hurdle to overcome.”14 A poor credit score, said the sponsor, does not reveal the person’s
ability to perform the job: “Having bad credit does not make someone a bad person . . . .
Costly medical problems, a messy divorce, and many other understandable reasons to
have poor credit have nothing to do with one’s ability to do a good job.”15 Though the
business and credit reporting communities opposed the bill when it had previously been
considered,16 the bill eventually passed in 2011 as the effects of the recession wore on. 17
on-credit-reporting/ (stating that every year 3 billion credit reports are issued).
9 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.20.5 and CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5 (2013); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 8-2-126 (2013); 7 COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 1103-4:1-1103-4:12; CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 711(g); HAW. REV. STAT. § 3782(a)(8) (2013); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/5-70/30 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 §
600-A; MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 3-711 (2013); Nevada S.B. 127, amending ch.
713 (effective October 1, 2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320 (2013); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 495i (2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.010 (2013).
10 22 GUAM PUB. L. 33-35 (2015) (2015); § 5201(h) (West, WestlawNext .
11 See, e.g., H. 233, 85th Gen. Ass. (Iowa 2013); S. 80, 188th Gen. Ct. (Mass.
2013); A. 1799, 236th Sess. (N.Y. 2013); A. 2148, 236th Sess. (N.Y. 2013); S. 699,
108th Sess. (Tenn. 2013); H.B. 2532, 81st Sess. (W. Va. 2013).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 19 to 30.
13 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b) (2012).
14 Laura Basset, Maryland Lawmaker Reintroduces Bill to Ban Credit Checks in
Hiring Process, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/26/maryland-jobapplicant-fairness-act_n_814154.html.
15
16

Id.
Id.

The bill, 2011 Maryland Laws Ch. 28 (S.B. 132) (H.B. 87), was passed on April 12,
2011.
17
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Though employers may insist that credit reports aid their decisions, empirical data
has not established a material link between an employee’s credit record and that
employee’s job performance, notwithstanding the widespread practice of checking credit
reports by employers. In considering its bill, the Oregon legislature elicited testimony
from an employee of one of the major credit reporting agencies TransUnion, learning
that the agency did not have any evidence that an employee’s credit history correlated
with subsequent job performance, casting doubts on the validity of such a check.18
These credit history cloaking laws have some common features. In general, the
statutes apply to similar types of information – a report that contains information about
the applicant’s credit history.19 Typically, they forbid employers from acting on the
contents of a credit report – that is, discriminating on the basis of credit information.20
The strictest laws prohibit employers from even obtaining a report.21 Connecticut has
the weakest prohibition; it merely bars employers from requiring an employee or
applicant to consent to a request for a credit report, without prohibiting an employer
from making the request, one that applicants might not feel free to deny.22
Of course, these prohibitions have exceptions, some of which threaten to swamp the
rule. For instance, most of the laws exempt some types of management positions.23
Testimony on Oregon’s Job Applicant Fairness Act, vimeo,
http://www.vimeo.com/24479508 (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
19 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.20.5(a) (2013); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a) (2013);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b) (2013); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/5 (2013); MD.
CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 3-711(b) (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. § 495i(a)(2), (3) (2013);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.010(4) (2013); 22 GUAM CIV. CODE ANN. § 5201(h).
20 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a); Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 711(g)(1); HAW. REV. STAT. §
378-2(a)(8); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/10(a); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 600-A(1);
MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 3-711(b), (c) (use for a non-prohibited purpose); OR.
REV. STAT. § 659A.320(1) (effective until Jan. 1, 2014); 21 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
495i(b); 22 Guam Civ. Code Ann. § 5201(h). Nevada comes close to prohibiting the
acquisition of a report, forbidding employers from inquiring concerning a consumer
credit report. NEV. REV. STAT. § 613(7)(3).
21 OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320(1) (effective until Jan. 1, 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. § 495i
(b) (2) (forbidding employers from “[i]nquir[ing] about an applicant or employee’s
credit report or credit history); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.020(c).
22 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b).
23 CAL. LAB. CODE 1024.5; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(4)(a) (managerial
positions), (c) (fiduciary positions); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 600-A(2)(A)
(“management of the company’s finances or a customer’s financial assets”); MD.
CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 3-711; NEV. REV. STAT. 613. Illinois exempts those
positions for which “a satisfactory credit history is an established bona fide
occupational requirement,” a feature that requires the presence of at least one of
18
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Other positions commonly exempted include those with financial institutions or that
involve monetary transactions,24 those with law enforcement,25 and those with certain
other governmental employers.26
seven designated circumstances, one of which is that the position is managerial.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/10(b)(4); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(c)(2)(E) (positions
requiring “a financial fiduciary responsibility to the employer or a client of the
employer”); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.7(a)(1) (credit history is related to a
bona fide occupational requirement and the employee has received a conditional
offer of employment), 378-2.7(a)(3) (the position is managerial or supervisory); 22
Guam Civ. Code Ann. § 5201(h)(2) (“the position is managerial and involves setting
the direction or control of the business”).
24 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(b) (institutions covered by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809); 1024(5)(A)-(C) (access to bank or credit card information along
with an individual’s date of birth and Social Security Number, excluding routine credit
card transactions); 1024.5(8) (positions involving regular access to cash totaling $10,000
or more); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 4-166 (financial institutions); HAW. REV. STAT. § 3782.7(a)(4); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/5 (excluding from the definition of “employer”); 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 70/10(b)(2), (3) (duties of the position include access to cash or assets worth
$2500 or more, or signatory power over assets of $100 or more); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, § 600-A(2)(B) (“employer is in the financial services industry”); MD. CODE
ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 3-711 (involves a fiduciary responsibility, including collecting
payments, and for those who are provided an expense account or corporate debit or
credit card); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613(7.5)(3)(a); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320 (federally insured
banks or credit unions); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(c)(1)(C); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
495i(c)(1)(B), (G) (access to confidential financial information and the employer’s
payroll, respectively).
25 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(3); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/5(3) (excluding from
the definition of “employer”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613(7.5)(3)(d); OR. REV. STAT. §
659A.320; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i (law enforcement, emergency medical
personnel, and firefighters); 22 Guam Civ. Code Ann. § 5201(h)(4), (6) (the
position involves “access to customers’, employees’, or the employer’s personal or
financial information other than information customarily provided in a retail
transaction,” or “includes an expense account”).
26 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5 (for positions with the state department of justice); 820
ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/5-70/30 (where a state or local agency requires a credit report as
a condition of employment); 70/10(b)(7) (where the employee’s credit history is
required by or exempt under federal or state law); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
19.182.010. Other typical exemptions include positions for which another law
requires the employer to examine an applicant’s credit report, CAL. CIV. CODE §
1785.20.5 and CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-166; ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 600-A(2)(C);OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320. Illinois identifies such
a legal requirement a condition that qualifies for an exception when paired with
another listed condition. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/10(b)(1) (state or federal law
requires bonding of the individual in the position), (7) (federal or state law otherwise
requires the employee’s credit history). Some states also exempt those positions that
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A few states weaken their general prohibitions by exempting a catch-all category of
positions for which an employer may rely on a credit report, rather than limiting
exemptions to specific categories. For instance, Oregon and Washington permit an
employer to obtain and act upon a credit report when the report’s information is
“substantially job related.”27 Vermont permits employers to use credit reports where
"[t]he employer can demonstrate that the information is a valid and reliable predictor of
employee performance in the specific position of employment."28 Hawaii also allows
some scrutiny, but only after a delay, permitting the employer to examine a credit
history that is “directly related to a bona fide occupational qualification,” so long as the
employer has extended a conditional offer of employment to the target.29 Nevada’s
general exception is so broad that it nearly eviscerates the general prohibition, allowing
employers to review credit reports when such information is “reasonably related to the
evaluation of the employee.”30
Notwithstanding such weakening exceptions, however, these restrictions indicate a
trend of increasing privacy, of recognizing that simply because information is available,
it should not necessarily be seen or used. Such laws install boundaries around an
individual’s financial life, and implicitly acknowledge that employees have a sphere of
existence outside that of their employment.
B. Criminal Record Information
In addition to seeking credit history information about employment candidates,
many employers want to know their criminal record history. A 2012 survey by the
grant the employee access to confidential customer or trade secret information. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1785.20.5 and CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5 (where the employee would have
regular access to bank or credit card information, social security numbers, and date
of birth, excluding routine credit card transactions, and positions with access to
designated confidential or proprietary information); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 4-166
(access to customer information or confidential or proprietary business information);
MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMP. 3-711 (access to confidential business information); 820
ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/10(b)(5); see also 22 Guam Civ. Code Ann. § 5201(h)(3) (the
position “meets criteria in specified federal or state administrative rules to establish
the circumstances when a credit history is a bona fide occupational requirement”).
27 OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320 (though requiring the employer to disclose its reasons
for obtaining the report to the applicant or employee); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
19.182.010.
28 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i.
29 HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.7(a)(1).
30 NEV. REV. STAT. § 613(7.5)(3). In addition, Nevada allows employers access to
employee’s credit information whenever another law authorizes it. Id. §
613(7.5)(1).
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Society for Human Resource Management reveals that 69% of employers investigate the
criminal background of every applicant.31 Such public record information has gotten
much more widely available; at one time, a comprehensive criminal background check
would have required a county-by-county visit to clerk’s counters, but now so many
records are available online that an individual’s record can be checked from one’s own
desk, or even a smartphone.32
While it seems intuitively obvious why employers would want to know of any
criminal taint on an applicant’s past, employee advocates worry that a criminal record –
even simply a single record of arrest – can unjustifiably wall off a candidate from
consideration for a position that does not necessarily require an unblemished
background.33 For one thing, the sheer numbers indicate that many will suffer the
“collateral consequences” of a criminal record: 8.6 percent of American adults have a
felony conviction, and approximately 65 million Americans have some kind of criminal
record.34 Accordingly, advocacy groups such as the National Employment Law Project
have urged states to reform their employment laws to reduce the impact of a criminal
background on an applicant’s candidacy.35
The federal act governing consumer reports, the FCRA, does not prohibit the
publishing of criminal convictions in credit reports at all.36 In contrast, records of arrest,
sentencing, and parole should disappear after seven years.37 However, the FCRA lifts the
seven year ban for jobs that can reasonably be expected to draw a salary of $75,000 or
more,38 a figure that has not risen since 1996, and likely allows employers to examine
credit histories for an ever-growing pool of positions.39
Nonetheless, some state credit reporting statutes restrict agencies from putting
Society for Hum. Resource Management, SHRM Survey Findings: Background
Checking – the Use of Criminal Background Checks in Hiring Decisions (Aug. 15,
2012), available at http://www.slideshare.net/shrm/2012-backgroundcheck31

criminalfinal.
32 Federal Trade Comm’n, FTC Warns Marketers That Mobile Apps May Violate
Fair Credit Reporting Act, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/02/mobileapps.shtm (Feb.
7, 2012).
33 National Employment Law Project, State Reforms Reducing Consequences for
People with Criminal Records: 2011-2012 Legislative Round-Up 1 (Sept. 2012),
available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/6ab3d3b51b9490b40c_cnm6b847q.pdf.
34 National Employment Law Project, State Reforms Reducing Consequences for
People with Criminal Records: 2011-2012 Legislative Round-Up 1, available at
http://nelp.3cdn.net/6ab3d3b51b9490b40c_cnm6b847q.pdf.
35

Id.

36

15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(5).

37

Id.

38

15 U.S.C. § 1681c(b)(3).
Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 2406(a)(2) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(b)).

39
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certain criminal record information into consumer reports.40 These restrictions vary
widely. New York, with one of the more robust provisions, flatly prohibits agencies from
reporting criminal arrest information for past charges unless the individual was
convicted of the offense.41 Furthermore, the state prohibits the reporting of criminal
convictions more than seven years old unless an exception applies.42 Similarly,
California prohibits not only the reporting of criminal record information that is more
than seven years old, but also the reporting of any pardoned convictions or other arrests,
indictments, or similar information where no conviction followed.43
Nonetheless, exclusions of criminal record information are often themselves subject
to an exclusion, returning such information to an employee’s credit report, similar to the
FCRA’s salary threshold exception.44 For instance, Washington prohibits records of
arrest, indictment, or conviction that predate the report by more than seven years.45
However, the Washington state statute, and those of New Hampshire, Maryland, and
Kansas as well, lift the cloak on the prohibited criminal record information for jobs that
could reasonably be expected to draw a salary of $20,000 or more.46 Thus, while the
FCRA protects job applicants who expect to earn between $20,000 and $75,000 from
information about criminal arrests that are more than seven years old, these would
permit employers to see that information. Similarly, New York allows the continued
reporting of criminal convictions where the user is seeking to employ the individual for
an annual salary of $25,000 or more.47 Maine, Colorado, and Texas align themselves
with the federal act, permitting criminal record reporting for higher earners, those
earning $75,000 or more.48 In contrast, Massachusetts, Montana, and California
maintain the exclusion of criminal record information from consumer reports regardless
of the expected salary of the particular employment position.49
40

See infra text accompanying notes 41 to 49.

N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 380-j(a)(1). The statute does permit a consumer reporting
agency to disclose the detention of the consumer by a retail mercantile
establishment so long as he or she has executed an uncoerced admission of
wrongdoing, and received a prescribed notice from the establishment. Id. at 380j(b).
42 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 380-j(f)(1)(v).
43 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.13(a)(6).
44 See supra text accompanying notes 38 to 39.
45 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.040.
46 MD. CODE. COMM. LAW § 14-1203(b)(3); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-704(b)(3); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 359-B:5(II)(c); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 19.182.040(2)
47 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 380-(j)(f)(2)(iii).
48 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-14.3-105.3(2)(c); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1313-B(2)(C);
TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE § 20.05(b)(3).
49 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 52; MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-3-112; Cal Code §
1785.13.
41
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Some states address this issue by restricting employers, as opposed to restricting the
contents of credit reports.50
Notwithstanding such weaknesses, though, these state measures evince attempts by
states to calibrate the appropriate balance between an individual’s past and an
employer’s legitimate interest in that past, revealing reasonably relevant information
while cloaking the rest. Without evidence that stale criminal convictions, or arrests not
resulting in convictions, impede one’s employment skills, these states should consider
raising the salary threshold for their exceptions, or perhaps eliminating the exceptions
altogether.
C. Medical Debt Restrictions
While the rising impact of criminal record information on consumer reports likely
arises from enhanced conversion of archived paper records to electronic ones, that is,
the accessibility to information, the rise in consumer credit records tarnished by medical
debt may arise more from the increased financial burden that health care puts on many
Americans.51 Medical debt is a leading cause of bankruptcies in America.52 As the costs
See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 32-1341-1345 (prohibiting employers from inquiring
about criminal convictions until after making a conditional offer of employment,
but providing exceptions); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 34:6B-11-34:6B-19 (prohibiting
employers from inquiring about an applicant’s criminal record during the initial
employment application process, or from providing in an advertisement that the
employer will not consider applicants with criminal records, but providing
exceptions); 2015 Or. Laws 559 (declaring it to be an unlawful practice for an
employer to “exclude an applicant from an initial interview solely because of a
past criminal conviction,” but providing exceptions); see also Md. Code Ann.
Crim. Pro. §§ 10-301-10-306 (instituting a process by which to shield criminal
record information, and prohibiting employers and educational institutions from
requiring applicants to disclose shielded information, with exceptions).
51 See, e.g., Adrianne Kroepsch, Report Finds Medical Debt Increasing,
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Newsletters/Washington-Health-Policy-inReview/2007/Mar/Washington-Health-Policy-Week-in-Review---March-5--2007/Report-Finds-Medical-Debt-Increasing.aspx (Feb. 27, 2007). Though
consumers’ share of overall spending has decreased, because the cost of health
care has been growing so quickly, overall bills have risen. Sarah Kliff, Patients
Share of Health Spending is Shrinking. Yes, Really,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/05/out-of-pockethealth-spending-is-shrinking-yes-really/ (Feb. 5, 2013).
52 One scholar testified that in 2007 that 69.9% of bankruptcies included medical
bills of $1,000 or more, a 49.6% increase in the comparable percentage in 2001.
Written Testimony of Steffie Woolhandler before the House Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Administrative and Commercial Law, July 28, 2009.
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of medical care have soared out of all proportion with the rate of inflation, and incomes
at most levels have remained still or have even fallen (along with employment rates),
Americans increasingly find themselves burdened with medical debt that may appear
on, and taint, their credit reports.53 The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau has reported that over half of the collections tradelines on a
group of credit reports it studied consisted of medical debt.54 Even one single medical
bill can keep one from receiving credit at a desirable rate, or perhaps from receiving
credit at all.55 But no clear link between financial competence and medical debt has
appeared; it is not intuitively obvious that it should, as few people voluntarily or
frivolously take on expensive medical care. In fact, one study by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau indicated that consumers with medical debt were better risks than
those with other sorts of debts in collection, and that many of them “ordinarily pay their
other financial obligations on time.”56 Furthermore, errors in such accounts are
notorious,57 so people may find themselves blacklisted for debts that they have not even
truly incurred, or ones for which an insurance company is responsible.58
The weak relationship between medical debt and credit worthiness led the credit
scoring company Fair Isaac to reduce the impact of some types of medical debt in its
trademarked FICO credit scoring algorithm.59 Such an adaptation reveals that
legislation may not be the only source of relief to consumers struggling to borrow in the
See Kathy Kristof, Getting Sick Can Kill Your Credit Score, CBS Moneywatch
(May 21, 2014), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/getting-sick-can-killyour-credit-score/; Kate Santich, Medical Bills Can Bankrupt Insured, ORLANDO
53

SENTINEL A1 (July 31, 2011).
54 Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, Consumer Credit Reports: A Study of
Medical and Non-Medical Collections 15 (2014), available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201412_cfpb_reports_consumer-credit-medicaland-non-medical-collections.pdf.
55 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, When Health Costs Harm Your Credit, N.Y. TIMES
SUNDAY REVIEW, Mar. 8, 2014 at SR4.
56 Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, supra note 54, at 7, 38
57 Estimates of errors in medical bills range from 30% to 80%. Jessica SilverGreenberg, How to Fight a Bogus Bill, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 18,
2011).
58 See Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, supra note 54, at 39-42 (describing the
complexity and lack of transparency of medical costs, insurance coverage, and the
billing process).
59 See, FICO Score 9 Introduces Refined Analysis of Medical Collections – FICO,
http://www.fico.com/en/about-us/newsroom/news-releases/fico-score-9-introducesrefined-analysis-medical-collections/ (Aug. 7, 2014) (stating that “[t]his will help ensure
that medical collections have a lower impact on the score, commensurate with the credit
risk they represent”).
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face of existing medical debt.
While no state prohibits outright the inclusion of medical debt in a consumer report
or in calculating a credit score, Congress recently considered a bill that would amend the
FCRA to remove from consumer reports information about such any medical debt that
was eventually paid up or settled, thus clearing the usual seven year stickiness.60 States
could consider imposing similar restrictions on consumer reporting agencies to prevent
consumer’s reports from being hurt disproportionately to the consumer’s actual
willingness to pay his or her debts. A more dramatic, and helpful, provision would be to
remove medical debts from consumer reports entirely.
D. Identity Theft Provisions
Identity theft, an Internet-powered phenomenon, has caused intense misery to its
hapless victims, who may find themselves shadowed by a pernicious doppelganger
whose spendthrift records they cannot purge from their credit histories. The Federal
Trade Commission reported that in 2014 identity theft once againtopped the list of
consumer complaints to the agency, clocking in at 332,646, up from 290,056 in 2013.61
States have been contending with the rising impact of identity theft on consumers’ credit
reports. Fundamentally, the relationship between identity theft and a credit report is
one of inaccuracy – once a thief obtains goods, credit, or services in the identity theft
victim’s name and then fails to pay for them, the lender wrongly ascribes the debt to the
victim of the theft rather than to the thief. The debt then shows up not on the thief’s
credit report, but on the victim’s.
In an example of one state’s attempt to protect the credit reports of identity theft
victims, New Mexico enacted a statute that sought to allow identity theft victims to block
a thief’s debt from the victim’s credit report. Under the New Mexican statute, once a
consumer reporting agency has received a proper notice from an identity theft victim
that identifies information reported to or by the consumer reporting agency on the basis
of identity theft, the agency must remove the information from the victim’s file.62 The
agency may restore the information only if the consumer requests it or pursuant to a

S. 160, The Medical Debt Responsibility Act of 2013 § 3 (113th Cong., 1st Sess.
2013) (proposing an amendment to 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a), the obsolescence
provision described above, that would delete from credit reports “[a]ny
information related to a fully paid or settled medical debt that had been
characterized as delinquent, charged off, or in collection which, from the date of
payment or settlement, antedates the report by more than 45 days”).
61 Federal Trade Comm’n, Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book for JanuaryDecember 2014 5, available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-networkdata-book-january-december-2014/sentinel-cy2014-1.pdf
62 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-3A-2(D), 56-3A-3.1(A), (D) (West 2014).
60
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court order after it has adjudicated the alleged debt.63 The provision significantly
overlaps with one in the federal FCRA, but the federal statute gives consumer reporting
agencies a good deal more leeway to decline to block an identity theft debt.64 The FCRA
permits an agency to decline, sua sponte, to block an item of information if it
determines that the agency mistakenly blocked it, if the consumer misrepresented a
material fact about the information, or if the consumer obtained goods, services, or
money as a result of the blocked transaction.65 This right to act unilaterally can
eviscerate the protection the provision intended to give to identity theft victims.
Thus, these four areas of consumer report concerns – employer use of consumer
reports, criminal record information in consumer reports, medical debt in consumer
reports, and effects of identity theft on consumer reports – are fertile for state
intervention in order to protect citizens from consequences disproportionate to their
failures. However, state legislation must avoid preemption by the federal Fair Credit
Reporting Act in order to be effective. The following section discusses general principles
of preemption and analyzes some of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in the area of
preemption.
III.

THE THREE VARIETIES OF PREEMPTION
AND THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT PREEMPTION DECISIONS

The Supreme Court has taken up the issue of preemption in a fistful of cases over the
last several years. These cases will guide the preemptive effect of the federal Fair Credit
Reporting Act on state innovations intended to improve the privacy of their citizens’
historical records.
As a basic matter, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution is the
mechanism that elevates federal laws over state ones. The second clause of Article VI
provides that the laws of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . .
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
Now, obviously federal and state laws can peacefully co-exist – our system encourages
simultaneous federal and state authority.66 Nonetheless, under limited circumstances
federal law will neutralize an overlapping state law.
Preemption occurs in three basic varieties: field, express, and implied. Of these,
express preemption most influences the viability of state credit reporting restrictions.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-3A-3.1(E).
15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(c).
65 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(c)(1)(A)-(C).
66 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012) (“[f]ederalism, central to
the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and State
Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect”).
63
64
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A. Field Preemption – ““so pervasive . . . or so dominant”67
Field preemption preempts the most extensively; it clears an entire subject area from
state regulation, reserving it for federal dominion.68 Field preemption itself has two
sorts. The first measures breadth, and allows federal law to override any state law in the
same field where the federal law’s framework is “so pervasive” it leaves no room for state
regulation.69 The second sort measures intensity, and occurs when the federal interest is
“so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject.”70
B. Express Preemption – “a fair but narrow reading”71
While field preemption can exist without any action by Congress, express
preemption arises only when Congress plants specific language in a federal act to target
state legislation.72 Even though the language may be explicit, however, courts must still
construe it when evaluating its impact on a specific state provision, raising the question
of how they should they should do so: broadly, narrowly, or somewhere in between?
The Supreme Court recently examined express preemption in the 2013 decision of
Dan’s City Used Cars v. Pelkey,73 an action that pitted a consumer whose car had been
towed and sold without his consent against a federal law that the defendant, the towing
authority, asserted barred any state claim by the consumer. This decision followed three
significant 2008 decisions about express preemption: Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,74
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,75 and Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n.76 Taken
67 Rice

v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
See, e.g. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595, 1599 (2015)
(describing field preemption as arising when “Congress may have intended ‘to
foreclose any state regulation in the area,’ irrespective of whether state law is
consistent or inconsistent with ‘federal standards,’” and holding that the federal
Natural Gas Act did not preempt state antitrust lawsuits) (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
69 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501.
70 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2501; see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
554 U.S. 471, 488 (2008) (holding that the Clean Water Act’s penalties for water
pollution did not preempt maritime common law on punitive damages, stating that “we
see no clear indication of congressional intent to occupy the entire field of pollution
remedies”).
71 Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 80 (2008).
72 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2500.
73 2013 WL 1942398 (May 13, 2013).
74 555 U.S. 70 (2008).
75 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
76 552 U.S. 364 (2008).
68
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together, the four cases illustrate that so long as the federal provision leaves some space
for states to occupy, the Court is willing to allow states to fill that area.
First, an express preemption provision that preempts state laws “with respect to” a
designated area that federal law regulates will receive a compact reading.77 In Dan’s
Used City, the unhappy former car owner sued the towing company under a state
consumer protection law that prescribed specific procedures for the storage and sale of a
towed vehicle, procedures that he alleged the towing company failed to comply with.78
The defendant relied on a preemption provision of the Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act (known by the ungainly acronym “FAAAA”), which appeared to reach
broadly into state domains. This provision stated that “a state . . . may not enact or
enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to
a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of
property.”79
The phrase “related to” “’reflects a broad pre-emptive purpose.’”80 Nonetheless, the
Court resolved that even such a broad phrase “does not mean the sky is the limit”; it
“does not preempt state laws affecting carrier prices, routes, and services” “in only a
‘tenuous, remote, or peripheral manner.’”81 The Court cautioned that the “related to”
language could not have too broad and literal an effect, else “’for all practical purposes
preemption would never run its course.’”82 In this particular provision, the “related to”
language was further limited by the phrase “with respect to the transportation of
property.”83 In determining the effect of the language, the Court focused on the different
time periods involved: the federal Act addressed the period in which a particular vehicle
was in transit and stored in assistance to that transport, while the plaintiff’s state law
claims addressed a period well after the car had been towed, that is, the period of the
sale, not of the movement, of the car. This distinction maintained the vitality of the state
statutory scheme related to the sale of towed cars as well as the state common law
bailment claims.84
To check its analysis, the Court examined the purpose behind Congress’s enactment
of the preemption provision, and concluded that the state law claims would not in any
77

See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 80-81 (2008).

133 S. Ct. at 1775; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262:36-a.
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (emphasis added).
80 Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. 1769, 1778 (2013) (citation
omitted).
81 Id. (quoting Rowe v. New Hampshire Transport Ass’n, 552 U.S. at 371 (2008)).
82 Id. (quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 655, 665-66 (1995)).
83 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
84 Dan’s City Used Cars, 133 S.Ct. at 1779.
78
79
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way interfere with that purpose, which was to prevent states from “constrain[ing]
participation in interstate commerce.”85
The preference for reading broad preemption language narrowly reflected in Dan’s
City also prevailed in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good. The primary express preemption
provision in Altria provided as follows: “No requirement or prohibition based on
smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or
promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the
provisions of this chapter.”86 The state statute in question was Maine’s deceptive
practices act statute.87 The petitioners, who were cigarette manufacturers, alleged that
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempted the respondents’ claims
under the state statute.88 The respondents were smokers who had smoked “light”
cigarettes that the petitioners had manufactured.89 They had brought a state law
deceptive trade practices claim against the manufacturers that alleged that the
petitioners had advertised that the “light” cigarettes passed less tar and nicotine to
consumers than regular cigarettes; however, the respondents alleged that the
manufacturers knew that this was not so.90 The manufacturers argued that the Labeling
Act’s express preemption provision preempted the state statute, and thus barred the
smokers’ claims.91
Thus, the question was whether the state deceptive practices act, when applied to
challenge the advertising of cigarettes as light, constituted a state law “based on smoking
and health . . . with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes . . . .” The
Court construed the phrase “based on smoking and health” as modifying the state law
taken as a whole, as opposed to the particular application of the law.92 Thus, the Court
stepped back from the context of the immediate application of the state law and looked
at the law itself – was it one “based on smoking and health”? The Court reasoned that
Id. at 1780. In that same term, the Supreme Court construed this preempting
provision of the FAAAA and concluded that it preempted a local requirement
regarding placard and parking. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of L.A.,
133 S. Ct. 2096, 2104 (2013). There, however, the issue was not whether the
requirement related, as a substantive matter, to “a price, route, or service of any
motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property,” 49 U.S.C. §
14501(c)(1), but rather whether the requirement “ha[d] the force and effect of law.’”
Id., 133 S. Ct. at 2102.
86 15 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b) (West) (emphasis added).
87 555 U.S. at 72; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 207 (Supp. 2008)
88 555 U.S. at 72.
85

Id.
Id.
91 Id. at 80-88. The manufacturers also argued that the state law was preempted
under a theory of implied obstacle preemption. Id. at 88-90. This aspect of Altria
is discussed infra in part II.B.
89
90

92

555 U.S. at 80.
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the clause should be given “’a fair but narrow reading.’”93 The state deceptive practices
act said nothing about either “smoking” or “health,”94 but rather targeted deceptive
statements that induced the respondents to buy the petitioners’ cigarettes, imposing a
general duty not to deceive, rather than one bound to smoking and health.95 Thus, the
express preemption provision did not preempt an action under a state’s general
deceptive trade practices statute.96
However, in two other recent express preemption cases, the Court concluded that the
federal statute’s preemption provision did in fact squelch the state law at issue. From
these we discern first that a federal law that targets state “requirements” and
“prohibitions” extends to state common law torts in addition to state statutes. What’s
more, the Court will examine the policies behind the federal law and the overlapping
state law, and will be more likely to find preemption when those policies promote
different goals. In addition, the Court has indicated that it will honor specific
boundaries, even if they cover a broad expanse, and will preempt even generally
applicable common laws.97
An expansive preemption provision written in concrete terms will be given expansive
preemption power. In Riegel v. Medtronic, the Court construed the express preemption
provision of the federal Medical Device Amendments Act (the “MDA”).98 This provision
was quite broad, providing that a state shall not have “any requirement . . . which is
different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable” under federal law to the
device.99 In effect, this provision left room for the states to enact only identical twins of
the federal provision.
Riegel’s petitioners, a husband a wife, sued the manufacturer of a catheter under
state strict liability, negligence, and similar laws after the device ruptured.100 First the
Court concluded that the FDA’s premarket approval process imposed “requirements”
under the MDA, activating the statute’s preemption provision.101 Thus, the next question
was whether the state’s common law claim was a “requirement . . . different from, or in
addition to” that premarket approval. Common law duties are, the Court concluded,
555 U.S. at 80 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524
(1992)).
94 Id.
95 555 U.S. at 82-83.
96 555 U.S. at 87 (“In sum, we conclude now, as the plurality did in Cipollone, that ‘the
phrase ‘based on smoking and health’ fairly but narrowly construed does not encompass
the more general duty not to make fraudulent statements.’”).
97 Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
98 552 U.S. 312.
99 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
100 552 U.S. at 319.
101 552 U.S. at 322.
93
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“requirements” for purposes of an express preemption provision.102 The petitioners,
unfortunately, had failed to pursue an argument that their state law claims nonetheless
survived as requirements that were simply parallel to, as opposed to different from or in
addition to the federal law’s, and thus lost their case once the Court concluded that their
claims constituted “requirements.”103
Even where an express preemption provision is less expansive, preemption becomes
more likely when the federal and state laws have fundamentally different purposes and
the state law’s purpose coincides with the motivation behind the federal law’s express
preemption provision. In Rowe v. New Hampshire Transport Ass’n,104 the Court
examined the preemption language of the Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act of 1994,105 the same statute that the Court addressed five years later
in Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey.106 The language of the preemption provision was
as follows: “a State . . . may not enact or enforce a law . . . related to a price, route, or
service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.”107 Maine,
hoping to cut back on minors’ use of tobacco, had enacted two provisions that imposed
specific requirements for the transport and delivery of tobacco products.108 The federal
statute was designed to expand interstate trucking commerce by deregulating it; in
552 U.S. at 324. The Court reasoned that “Congress is entitled to know what
meaning this Court will assign to terms regularly used in its enactments,” 552
U.S. at 324. The Court had previously interpreted a federal preemption
provision’s use of “requirements” as including state common law duties. Bates v.
Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005); Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S.
470 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). The Court
rejected the petitioners’ argument that even if common-law duties were
“requirements,” they were not requirements “with respect to devices,” reasoning
that the statutory text did not “suggest[] that the pre-empted state requirement
must apply only to the relevant device . . . .” 552 U.S. at 328. See also Premium
Mortg. Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., 583 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 2009) (construing the
language of an FCRA preemption provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b) that referred to
a “requirement or prohibition” under state law as encompassing common law
claims as well as statutory claims).
103 Id. at 330.
104 552 U.S. 364 (2008).
105 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
106 133 S. Ct. 1769, 1778 (2013); see supra text accompanying notes 78 to 85.
107 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
108 The first, imposing two requirements, forbade anyone other than a statelicensed tobacco retailer to accept an order for tobacco delivery, and to require a
licensed retailer that accepts an order and ships tobacco to use a delivery service
that verifies the identity of the recipient. 552 U.S. 368 (citing ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-C(1), C(3)(C)). The second forbade any person from knowingly
transporting a tobacco product to a person unless either the sender or the
receiver had a Maine license, and designated circumstances as deeming
knowledge. 552 U.S. at 369 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-D).
102
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contrast, the state law was designed to improve public health, two objectives in tension,
at least in this instance.
The respondents in Rowe, transport associations affected by the state laws, sued to
block them, arguing that the federal act’s express preemption provision nullified the
state laws.109 In an earlier decision, Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the Court had
interpreted similar preemptive language as applying to state enforcement actions in
connection with “’rates, routes, or services’” even where the state law only indirectly
affected those attributes.110 Reasoning from Morales, the Rowe court concluded that the
two Maine laws not only had a direct “connection with” motor carrier services, but that
the provisions would have a “’significant’ and adverse ‘impact’ in respect of the federal
Act’s ability to achieve its pre-emption-related objectives,” dooming the state laws.111
The Court also declined to create a “public health objective” exception to the preemption
provision, though Maine tried to distinguish its laws from the sort of economic
regulation it argued Congress had intended to preempt.112 The federal law in Rowe was
unusual because it sought to deregulate, rather than regulate; to clear the table of
restrictions on trucking whether they be federal or state. Thus, Maine’s laws, clearly
directed towards imposing extra burdens on the trucking industry, directly undermined
Congress’s free market intent.
The difference between Rowe and Dan’s City, the subsequent case interpreting this
provision and which permitted, rather than preempted, a state law, lies in the strength
of the link between the subject of the state law involved and “a price, route, or service of
any motor carrier.”113 The Dan’s City state law related to events subsequent to the
transportation of a vehicle, a time period distinctly subsequent to the time period that
the federal law was concerned with, the transporting period.114 That link was too weak to
bring the state law into the orbit of the preemption provision.115
So, taken collectively, Dan’s City, Altria, Riegel, and Rowe indicate that a state is
more likely to successfully avoid preemption with a general duty, rather than an areaspecific law, and that a court will honor broad but specific boundary setting and
Congress’s motivation for including the preemption provision.

552 U.S. at 369.
504 U.S. 374 (1992).
111 552 U.S. at 371-72, 373.
112 552 U.S. at 374.
113 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
114 138 S. Ct. at 1779.
109
110

115

Id.
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C. Implied Preemption – “Congress does not
cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action”116
Even where a federal law does not seek to pervade a field of regulation, and does not
contain an express preemption provision, it can still preempt an overlapping state law
through implied preemption. While field preemption removes an entire arena from state
regulation, implied preemption removes only those state laws that conflict with a
specific federal law.117 Such a conflict can arise in two ways. First, implied preemption
negates a state law when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility,” known as implied impossibility preemption.118 Second, a state
law must give way to a federal one where it “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” 119 that
is, undermining a policy that the federal law promotes, known as implied obstacle
preemption.120
The Court’s recent implied preemption cases reflect a great deal of deference to state
schemes, so long as the area was not one that Congress had pervasively regulated,
leading to field preemption. The Court is fond of quoting the purpose presumption: “[i]n
preemption analysis, courts should assume that ‘the historic police powers of the States’
are not superseded ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”121
This presumption places a thumb on the scale in favor of leaving state laws intact.
For instance, in Wyeth v. Levine, a 2009 case of implied preemption, the plaintiff
116

Medtronic, Inc. 518 U.S.at 485.

Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1981 (2011); see also Wos
v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S.Ct. 1391, 1398 (2013) (stating that “’[w]here
state and federal law “directly conflict,” state law must give way’”) (citations
omitted).
118 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963);
see also Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1950 (2013) (describing the
doctrine).
119 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S.
117

Ct. 1943, 1950 (2013) (describing the doctrine); International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493-94 (1987) (stating that “the Court must be guided
by the goals and policies of [a federal act],” and conclude that it preempts if a
state law claim would “serious[ly] interfere[] with the achievement of the ‘full
purposes and objectives of Congress’” or “with the methods by which the federal
statute was designed to reach” its goals) (citation omitted).
Thus, even without the express preemptive language in the federal statute at
issue in Rowe, Maine’s trucking laws might well have fallen to implied
preemption. See 552 U.S. at 271-72 (noting the conflict between the state’s
objectives and Congressional intent).
121 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc., v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 471, 485 (1996) (internal citation omitted)).
120
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brought a state failure to warn claim arising from method of administering anti-nausea
drug.122 The federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the “FDCA”) did not contain an
express preemption clause relevant to prescription drugs.123 However, the defendant,
the drug’s manufacturer, argued that the FDCA preempted the state law claim under
two theories: first, that it was impossible to comply with both the state’s warning
requirements and the FDCA, and second, that the FDCA created an obstacle such that
complying with state law would obstruct the purposes and objectives of the federal drug
labeling regulation led the Court to reject both arguments: “[w]e rely on the
presumption because respect for the States as ‘independent sovereigns in our federal
system’ leads us to assume that ‘Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes
of action.’”124 Below is discussed recent Supreme Court work on both implied
impossibility preemption and implied obstacle preemption.
1. Implied Impossibility Preemption
Implied impossibility preemption arises under the fairly narrow circumstances
where a regulated entity cannot comply with one sovereign’s law without simultaneously
violating the other’s.
Where a regulated entity does not maintain full control over all contingencies needed
to comply with the federal law, state law, or both, the implied impossibility preemption
doctrine will likely block the state law, even in the absence of an actual conflict. The
Supreme Court recently nullified state law claims on the grounds of implied
impossibility by construing “impossible” broadly.125 In PLIVA v. Mensing, two patients
were prescribed a generic form of a prescription drug that the defendants manufactured,
and then subsequently developed a serious neurological disorder known to be associated
with the drug.126 They sued under their respective state’s tort laws for damages, claiming
that the manufacturers should have warned of the dangers of developing the condition
once a patient took the medication for more than twelve weeks.127 The preemption issue
arose because Congress imposed slightly different federal drug labeling duties on
generic drug manufacturers than on brand name drug manufacturers.128 Under FDA
regulations, a generic drug manufacturer could acquire approval by showing that its
warning label was the same as the brand name’s.129 Under state law, the manufacturers

555 U.S. 555 (2009).
555 U.S. at 567.
124 555 U.S. at 565 n.3 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485).
125 PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
126 Id. at 2572-73.
127 Id. at 2573.
128 Id. at 2574.
122
123

129

Id.
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had to “adequately and safely label their products.”130
Of course, new information could require a new warning under either the state or the
federal law. However, the Court construed the FDA’s regulations as prohibiting a
unilateral change; only with the FDA’s cooperation could the manufacturer have
updated the label to warn of the dangers associated with the neurological condition the
plaintiffs had acquired, learned of only after the FDA approved the original label.131 In
other words, once the contingency between the manufacturer and the label change was
not completely within the manufacturer’s sole control, a scenario arose whereby the
manufacturer could no longer be absolutely certain of being able to comply with both
the federal and the state law. Since the only way they could have guaranteed that their
labels would comply with state law would be to have unilaterally changed them, an act
that would have violated federal law, the Court reasoned that the doctrine of implied
impossibility preemption applied to block the state law claims.
Furthermore, if the ability to comply with the dual systems would require the
regulated party to abandon the regulated activity, that party can claim impossibility and
thus trigger preemption, annulling the state law.132 Subsequent to PLIVA, in the 2013
case of Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, the Supreme Court reviewed the labeling
law involved in PLIVA and permitted a manufacturer to claim that it could not possibly
comply with both a state tort duty to warn of unreasonable dangers of a generic drug
while also acceding to a federal law’s requirement that it warn only of those dangers that
the brand-name equivalent manufacturer had attached to that product’s label.133 The
Court thus vacated a judgment for a woman whose skin had burned off, a side effect of a
generic drug that had not explicitly warned of the known risk of the syndrome that befell
her.134 The Court specifically rejected the First Circuit’s reasoning that the generic drug
manufacturer could have complied with both the state and federal drug laws by simply
ceasing to sell the generic drug, reasoning that the Court’s past preemption decisions
simply did not allow for that sort of leave-the-market solution, noting that it had not
used that rationale to escape preemption in PLIVA.135 As one dissenting opinion noted,
the Court’s majority opinion curiously omitted any reference to the purpose
presumption.136

Id. at 2577. The issue was whether the FDA’s regulations permitted the
generic drug manufacturers to update their warning labels in a way that would
meet the state law’s requirements of “warning of [known] dangers,” id. at 2573
(Minnesota’s law), or of “provid[ing] adequate instructions for safe use of a
product,” id. (Louisiana’s law).
131 Id. at 2578.
132 See Mutual Pharm. Co., v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
133 Id. at 2470-72.
134 Id. at 2476.
135 Id. at 2476.
136 Id. at 2483 and n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
130
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Thus, the Court’s recent impossibility preemption cases indicate that if the ability to
comply with both state and federal law hinged on a contingency outside the defendant’s
exclusive control, the federal law would preempt the state law. This preemption would
occur even if the defendant had partial control over the contingency and even if the
contingency were likely to fall in favor of compliance, and the defendant need not seek
to resolve the conflict by withdrawing from the market.
2. Implied Obstacle Preemption
Federal law will also trump a state law that “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”
Preemption under this doctrine, known as implied obstacle preemption, is relatively
unusual.
Sometimes a state law will parallel a federal one, but will provide a remedy that the
federal law lacks, sprouting the question of whether the federal claim – and its lack of a
remedy – should bar the consumer from recovering. The absence of a federal remedy
will not necessarily indicate that Congress wanted to leave consumers without any
remedy, and may in fact indicate that it expected consumers to pursue remedies under
state law. For instance, in concluding that the FDCA did not bar an injured plaintiff’s
state failure to warn claim in Wyeth v. Levine the Court considered the preference for
consumers to have remedies.137 It reasoned that Congress’s choice not to provide a
federal remedy for consumers harmed by unsafe or ineffective drugs indicated that
Congress thought that “widely available state rights of action provided appropriate relief
for injured consumers.”138 Further, the Court saw great significance in Congress’s choice
to enact an express preemption provision for medical devices, but not for prescription
drugs.139 Thus, the absence of an express preemption provision can indicate that
“Congress [did not think] state lawsuits posed an obstacle to its objectives.”140 The
federal agency’s practices also favored preserving state law, given that the FDA
“traditionally regarded state law as a complementary form of drug regulation. The FDA
has limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market.”
As noted above, the petitioners in Altria, cigarette manufacturers fighting a state
deceptive practices act claim arising from their advertising their cigarettes as “light,”
advanced an implied preemption argument in addition to the express preemption one. 141
The Court concluded that the state deceptive trade practices statute was not impliedly
preempted by virtue of “presenting an obstacle to a longstanding policy” of the FTC, the
137
138

555 U.S. at 574.
Id.

Id.
Id.
141 Altria, 555 U.S. at 87.
139
140
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federal agency charged with administering the federal Labeling Act.142 The Court
reviewed the agency’s guidance and consent orders and concluded that no relevant
longstanding policy existed.
In summary, where a state wants to regulate an area that the federal government has
penetrated, it should evaluate the potential for preemption by any existing federal
provision in the area regulated. If the area is one that the federal government has
penetrated pervasively, the state law may fall to field preemption. If a federal law has
express preemption language, the state law may nonetheless be able to intercede in the
gaps of the preemption provision, especially in areas traditionally within states’ purview,
given that the preemption provision should receive a narrow construction. Nonetheless,
where the purpose behind the preemption provision conflicts with the state’s regulation,
the preemption provision may well be construed to encompass the state law, nullifying
it. Finally, state provisions that clear field and express preemption must still overcome
any implied preemption, but in that contest they will benefit from the purpose
preemption, which favors preserving the state law.
The next question is what all this preemption doctrine means for state efforts to
restrict the information available in consumers’ credit reports, specifically information
related to adverse credit history when evaluated for employment, criminal background
information, medical information, and identity theft debris.
IV.

SURMOUNTING THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT’S BARRIERS

Taken together, the Court’s recent preemption decisions generally bode well for
preserving state claims. First, field preemption will not preclude states from intervening
to protect consumer financial information. Congress has quite clearly not taken over this
area, given that the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the premier piece of federal legislation in
this area, itself expressly evinces room for state action.143 Nonetheless, the FCRA
presents express and implied preemption challenges for states.
Below follows a brief description of the FCRA and an extended discussion of its
various preemption provisions, along with a summary of the case law construing those
provisions. Subsequently is discussed the likelihood that given the Supreme Court’s
decisions along with the role and provisions of the FCRA, the various types of state
reputation-protecting legislation identified above would prevail against a challenge of
preemption.
A. The FCRA
The FCRA provides the primary federal control over consumer reports, and it
142
143

555 U.S. at 89-90.
15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a); see infra text accompanying notes 148 to 150.
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conveys conflicting and complex messages about the role of state law in regulating
consumer credit reports. It creates a regulatory scheme for consumer reports, the name
it provides to credit reports. It explicitly recognizes state law by providing a general rule
that such laws are preserved. Nonetheless, it claims a monopoly over certain fields
within the territory of consumer report regulation, identifying specific kinds of state
laws that must yield to the federal act, such kinds varying by the degree to which they
relate to their corresponding federal provisions. After accounting for those monopolized
areas, though, the FCRA still leaves substantial room for states to act, fields in which
states can enact legislation to accord more weight to their citizens’ privacy.
1. Overall Scheme
The FCRA regulates “consumer reports,” commonly also known as credit reports,
although the definition clearly covers reports describing matters other than mere credit.
A consumer report “means any written, oral, or other communication of any
information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness,
credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics,
or mode of living” where that information is “used or expected to be used or collected”
for, among other purposes, “the consumer’s eligibility for employment.”144 A “consumer
reporting agency” includes “any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a
cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages . . . in the practice of assembling or
evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the
purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties . . . .”145 Thus, this definition
covers everything from the standard big three consumer reporting agencies of Trans
Union, Experian, and Equifax, to specialty agencies like tenant screening agencies146 and
the medical information data aggregator MIB.147
Looked at broadly, the FCRA imposes responsibilities not just on consumer
reporting agencies, but also on the users who buy consumer reports from agencies and
the furnishers who feed information about consumers to the agencies.
2. General Rule of Non-Preemption

15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C. § 1681(f). The definition includes an interstate commerce nexus as
well. Id.
146 For example, Tenant Background Search, which advertises that it can help a
landlord “[v]erify your applicant's identity and credit, and search for a criminal
background before you rent. Tenant Background Search is the leader in providing
high quality landlord tenant credit check and landlord tenant background check
services.” https://www.tenantbackgroundsearch.com/tenantScreening.aspx.
147 See http://www.mib.com/index.html (describing MIB’s services).
144
145
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By its express language, the FCRA provides that the Act does not preempt state law
claims:
Except as provided in subsections (b)148 and (c),149 this title does not
annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of this
title from complying with the laws of any State with respect to the
collection, distribution, or use of any information on consumers or for the
prevention or mitigation of identity theft, except to the extent that those
laws are inconsistent with any provision of this title, and then only to the
extent of the inconsistency.150
This explicit acknowledgement of the states’ interest eliminates pervasive field
preemption.151 Furthermore, that same acknowledgement shows that the federal
regulation does not have the dominance that would lead to intensity field
preemption.152 Accordingly, the remainder of this article will focus on express and
implied preemption.
This non-preemption language shows that Congress presumed that the federal
Providing exceptions. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b). See infra text accompanying notes
155 to 165.
149 Defining the term “firm offer of credit or insurance” for purposes of both
federal and state law. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b).
150 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a). This general preemption standard indicates that Congress did
not intend to comprehensively preempt states from the field of credit reporting
regulation. See Davenport v. Farmers Ins. Group, 378 F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir. 2004);
Credit Data of Ariz., Inc. v. State of Ariz., 602 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1979).
151 See supra text accompanying note 69; see also Davenport v. Farmers Ins.
Group, 378 F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that this provision
demonstrates that Congress did not intend to preempt the field of claims and
upholding against a challenge of preemption a state insurance statute that
regulated behavior not covered by the FCRA); Credit Data of Ariz., Inc. v. State of
Ariz., 602 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding against a challenge of
preemption a state statute that required consumer reporting agencies to provide
free reports, a provision that predated the FCRA’s present free report provisions
in 15 U.S.C. § 1681j(a)(1)); State Dep’t of Commerce, Community, & Econ. Dev.,
Div. of Ins. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 165 P.3d 624, 626-27 (Alaska 2007)
(upholding against a challenge of preemption a state law that forbade insurers
from failing to renew a personal insurance policy “based in whole or in part on a
consumer’s credit history or insurance score” without the consumer’s consent).
But see Consumer Data Indus. Ass’n v. King, 678 F.3d 898, 901 (10th Cir. 2012)
(asserting that “[t]he FCRA leaves no room for overlapping state regulations.
Congress set out to create uniform, national standards in the area of credit
reporting”) (dicta).
152 See supra text accompanying note 70.
148
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statute could coexist peacefully with a state statute, even one that overlies the same
territory, so long as the two are not inconsistent. In this way the FCRA expressly
incorporates a version of the implied preemption doctrine to supplement the act’s
express preemption provisions, discussed below. A state law is inconsistent with a
federal law only if complying with one would put the actor in violation of the other,153 or
if it would frustrate a particular purpose of the federal act.154
3. Specific Express Preemption Provisions
The FCRA somewhat undercuts its general rule of non-preemption by listing five sets
of FCRA provisions that it protects against any “requirement or prohibition [that] may
be imposed under the laws of any State.”155 Three of these sets target fairly narrow
practices of the FCRA:




The exchange of information among business affiliates;156
Designated disclosures required by the FCRA;157 and
The frequency with which consumers can obtain free consumer reports.158

Along with those three narrow sets, however, the remaining two sets cover a broad array
of FCRA provisions. The two sets differ in the reach of the area around the identified
provisions that remains reserved for the federal monopoly. The first of these sets, which
we will call “subject matter preempters,” preempts state requirements or prohibitions

153
154

See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963).
See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Cohen,

420 A.2d 189, 211 (Me. 1980) (testing the state provision against the “‘full
purposes and objectives’” of Congress).
155 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b).
156 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(2); see also American Bankers Ass’n v. Gould, 412 F.3d
1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that this provision preempted that part of the
California Financial Information Privacy Act to the extent that it attempted to
regulate the communication of information among affiliates), appeal after
remand 541 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2008) (narrowing the state statute to sever the
preempted portion).
157 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(3). The FCRA specifically exempts from this prohibition
specified laws of the states of California, id. § 1681t(b)(3)(A), and Colorado, id. §
1681t(b)(3)(B). In addition, the act limits the effect of this prohibition on state
laws regulating insurance activity. Id. § 1681t(b)(3)(C).
158 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(4). The FCRA specifically exempts from this prohibition
specified laws of the states of Colorado, Georgia, Maine Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Vermont in effect on December 4, 2003. Id. §
1681t(b)(4)(A)-(G).
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imposed as to the “subject matter regulated under” eleven specific FCRA provisions.159
159

15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(A)-(I). These eleven provisions are as follows:
(A) subsection (c) or (e) of section 1681b of this title, relating to the
prescreening of consumer reports;
(B) section 1681i of this title, relating to the time by which a consumer
reporting agency must take any action, including the provision of notification
to a consumer or other person, in any procedure related to the disputed
accuracy of information in a consumer's file, except that this subparagraph
shall not apply to any State law in effect on September 30, 1996;
(C) subsections (a) and (b) of section 1681m of this title, relating to the duties
of a person who takes any adverse action with respect to a consumer;
(D) section 1681m(d) of this title, relating to the duties of persons who use a
consumer report of a consumer in connection with any credit or insurance
transaction that is not initiated by the consumer and that consists of a firm
offer of credit or insurance;
(E) section 1681c of this title, relating to information contained in consumer
reports, except that this subparagraph shall not apply to any State law in
effect on September 30, 1996;
(F) section 1681s-2 of this title, relating to the responsibilities of persons who
furnish information to consumer reporting agencies, except that this
paragraph shall not apply-(i) with respect to section 54A(a) of chapter 93 of the Massachusetts
Annotated Laws (as in effect on September 30, 1996); or
(ii) with respect to section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code (as in effect
on September 30, 1996);
(G) section 1681g(e) of this title, relating to information available to victims
under section 1681g(e) of this title;
(H) section 1681s-3 of this title, relating to the exchange and use of
information to make a solicitation for marketing purposes; or
(I) section 1681m(h) of this title, relating to the duties of users of consumer
reports to provide notice with respect to terms in certain credit transactions.

15 U.S.C.A. § 1681t(b)(1). See Banga v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, No. 14-CV-03038WHO, 2015 WL 3799546, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2014) (holding that a state credit
reporting act’s prescreening provision was preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(A)); Bauer
v. Target Corp., 2012 WL 4054296, 8:12-CV-978-T-AEP, 2012 WL 4054296, at *5 (M.D.
Fla. Sept. 14, 2012) (holding that 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempted a claim under a
Florida state debt collection statute’s provision that regulated furnishers’ disclosure of
information about a debt); Galper v. JPMorgan Chase, N.A., No. 13 CIV. 3449, 2014 WL
1089061, at **3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2014) (holding that both a conversion claim and a
claim brought under a state statute that restricted the transmission of information
resulting from identity theft against a bank that had allegedly made false reports to
credit reporting agencies was preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(F)); Dickman v. Verizon
Communications, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 2d 166, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (concluding that claims
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The other group, which we will call “conduct preempters,” has a narrower scope,
eliminating only those state requirements or prohibitions that pertain to the “conduct
required by” eleven additional FCRA provisions.160 If we think of the provisions given
for breach of contract and for violation of a state deceptive practices act based on a
furnisher’s furnishing of false information to a credit reporting agency was preempted
by section 1681t(b)(1)(F)); Okocha v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 700 F. Supp. 2d 369, 375
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that a claim for violation of a state deceptive practices act
against an information furnisher for furnishing false information to a credit reporting
agency was preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(F)); Consumer Data Industry Ass’n v.
Swanson, No. 07-CV-3376 PJSJJG, 2007 WL 2219389, at *4 (D. Minn. July 30, 2007)
(holding that a state statute prohibiting “mortgage trigger” lists was preempted by
section 1681t(b)(1)(A)); see also Premium Mortg. Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., 583 F.3d 103,
106-07 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that mortgage lenders’ claims for misappropriation of
trade secrets, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment brought against credit
reporting agencies for their use of mortgage “trigger leads” were preempted by section
1681t(b)(1)(A)).
160 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(5)(A)-(I). This provision states as follows:
(b) General exceptions
No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State—
***
(5) with respect to the conduct required by the specific provisions of-(A) section 1681c(g) of this title [pertains to truncation of credit card and debit
card numbers];
(B) section 1681c-1 of this title [pertains to identity theft prevention, fraud
alerts, and active duty alerts];
(C) section 1681c-2 of this title [pertains to the blocking of information
resulting from identity theft];
(D) section 1681g(a)(1)(A) of this title [pertains to the truncation of
consumers’ social security numbers on their reports at their request];
(E) section 1681j(a) of this title [pertains to charges for reports made to
consumers, including the annual free report, and the time for reinvestigations
of information on such reports];
(F) subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 1681m of this title [pertain,
respectively, to the requirement that agencies issue “red flag” guidelines and
regulations; the prohibition on the sale or transfer of debt caused by identity
theft; and communications required of debt collectors concerning identity
theft];
(G) section 1681s(f) of this title [pertains to required coordination among
consumer reporting agencies with respect to consumer complaint
investigations];
(H) section 1681s-2(a)(6) of this title [pertains to the duties of furnishers upon
notice of identity theft-related information]; or
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preemptive power as poles planted in the ground of potential state regulation, those of
the subject matter preempters will cast a state-law-free shadow around them equivalent
in scope to the subject matter of that provision. In general the conduct preempters,
though, will cast almost no shadow at all, just wide enough to cover nearly identical
state provisions, those that require identical conduct.
Finally, the FCRA blocks state law in one other instance – not by preempting it, but
by providing qualified immunity from certain state laws to designated actors. 161 The
immunity is not absolute; a consumer can overcome it by showing that the defendant
provided false information with malice or with willful intent to injure the consumer.162
The provision plays a robust part in the analysis of preemption of the common law
claims it identifies, because to give it full effect, its gears must mesh with those of the
preemption provisions in order to allow all the provisions to be effective. Canons of
construction encourage giving full meaning to every provision in an act, and discourage
interpretations that render a provision superfluous.163 Accordingly, courts have had to
struggle to harmonize the preemption provisions with the qualified immunity provision
in order to ensure that they do not obviate the immunity - after all, no one needs to be
immunized from a preempted state law.
However, the impact of the qualified immunity provision is relatively irrelevant for
the purpose of enacting reputation-protecting state statutes. The question of the pool of
laws subject to qualified immunity has import for only those state causes of action that

161

(I) section 1681w of this title [pertains to the required disposal of records].
This provision states as follows:
Except as provided in sections 1681n and 1681o of this title, no
consumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of
defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the
reporting of information against any consumer reporting agency, any
user of information, or any person who furnishes information to a
consumer reporting agency, based on information disclosed pursuant
to section 1681g, 1681h, or 1681m of this title, or based on information
disclosed by a user of a consumer report to or for a consumer against
whom the user has taken adverse action, based in whole or in part on
the report2 except as to false information furnished with malice or
willful intent to injure such consumer.

15 U.S.C.A. § 1681h(e).
162

Id.

This is known as the rule against surplusage. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,
174 (2001) (it is a “’cardinal rule of statutory construction’” that “’a statute ought,
upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause,
sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant’”) (internal citation
omitted).
163
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are “in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence.”164 So long as a state
statute avoids presenting itself as a common law of one of these flavors it will not be
subject to qualified immunity. Therefore, no further discussion of the qualified
immunity provision of the FCRA is necessary here.
In its preemption provisions, the FCRA focuses on state “requirement[s] or
prohibition[s]” that have a particular relationship with a specified FCRA provision. 165
So, the question arises, how would the Supreme Court define the breadth of such a
relationship?
4. Significant Areas Clearly Free from FCRA Preemption
The FCRA identifies a slew of express preemption provisions that require close
analysis for purposes of the specific types of state statutes of concern here, gone into
below, to determine the extent of areas of regulation fenced off from the states.166
Nonetheless, large patches of the Act’s coverage are left bare for state intervention. The
specific rules regarding medical information, for instance.167 In addition, most of the
Act’s requirements for consumer reporting agencies to put accurate information in
agency-issued consumer reports are free from preemption provisions. This means that
states themselves can tighten the accuracy standards, improving the protection of their
consumers’ reputations.168 Similarly, states may enact procedures to reinvestigate
challenged data that would be more stringent than those in the FCRA.169 The FCRA also
left its requirements for obtaining a report for employment purposes free from
preemptive effect, leaving that area open to the states.170
In addition, the FCRA has special requirements for reports that contain detrimental
15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e).
15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)-(5). While the FCRA uses “relating to” in its
preemption section, it does so only to describe the content of the specific
preempting provisions. It uses “with respect to” to describe the relationship
between the state law and the preempting subject matter.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1681t(b)(5).
166 See supra text accompanying notes 155 to 160.
167 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(i) (defining medical information); 1681b(g) (requiring
agencies to code medical information so that the substance of the medical portion
is hidden).
168 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (requiring that “[w]henever a consumer reporting agency
prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about
whom the report relates).
169 15 U.S.C. § 1681i.
170 15 U.S.C. § 1681b; 1681b(b).
164
165
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public record information, information that would include bankruptcy and criminal
record information.171 This provision falls outside of the thicket of FCRA preemption
provisions, permitting states to impose additional requirements for public record
information.
Finally, the FCRA’s remedies provisions are largely unaffected by the FCRA’s
preemption provisions.172 States could provide additional protection to consumers by
enhancing the remedies available to those injured by the violation of a state provision,
for instance, by offering a treble damages provision. Although one district court has
concluded that the FCRA’s willfulness damages provision did preempt a Colorado
statute’s treble damages provision,173 the court seemed to misunderstand both the
FCRA’s punitive damages provision and the presumption against preemption.174
Below, the FCRA’s preemption provisions, viewed through the prism of the Supreme
Court’s recent express and implied preemption decisions, are applied to four areas that
are attractive candidates for state regulation: employers’ use of credit reports and other
kinds of background checks, the inclusion of criminal record information, the inclusion
of medical debt information, and identity theft protections.
B. Strategies for States
The FCRA’s relationship to state law, along with its express preemption provisions,
allow a fair amount of room in which states could operate to protect the reputations of
their citizens, so long as states craft those provisions carefully. With respect to the
regulation of consumer reports, no one could credibly argue that consumer credit
reporting is subject to field preemption.
15 U.S.C. § 1681k.
15 U.S.C. § 1681n (civil liability for willful non-compliance); 1681o (civil
liability for negligent non-compliance). A few FCRA provisions are expressly free
from the act’s remedies provisions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681s-1; 1681g(e)(6).
173 Eller v. Trans Union LLC, 2012 WL 786283, at **3-4 (D. Colo. Mar. 9, 2012).
174 Id. at *3. In assessing the FCRA’s provision for damages for willfulness, the
court noted only that the FCRA allows statutory damages, and failed to note that
the act also provides for punitive damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(B)(2). Not
only did the court fail to note the general rule of nonpresumption in 15 U.S.C. §
1681t(a), it misread the subsequent subsection as providing a list of FCRA
provisions that were exempt from preemption, when in fact it provides a list of
subsections that are expressly given preemptive effect. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b); see
supra text accompanying notes 155 to 160. Another Colorado district court has
permitted claims for punitive damages under both the FCRA and the Colorado
consumer reporting act, though without analyzing preemption. Eller v. Experian
Info. Solutions, Inc., 2011 WL 3365955, at **18-19 (D. Colo. May 17, 2011),
magistrate’s report and recommendation adopted 2011 WL 3365513 (Aug. 4,
2011).
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The preemption analysis benefits from the purpose presumption, a precept the Court
has often stressed, “that ‘the historic police powers of the States’ are not superseded
‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”175 The Court has
repeatedly emphasized this point.176 Under the remaining two preemption theories, a
state statute that may tread on an area that Congress has toiled in has to clear three
analytical hurdles - express preemption, and the two types of implied preemption implied impossibility preemption, and implied obstacle preemption.177
Taken together, the FCRA’s express preemption provisions evince that Congress
sought near exclusive control over the regulation of furnishers first,178 followed by a
somewhat less vigorous interest in controlling consumer reporting agencies, and even
less interest in controlling users of consumer credit reports. This indicates that the kind
of state legislation most likely to survive the preemption provision gantlet is legislation
targeted at the users of specific information. Further, while some regulation of agencies
might be permitted, very little regulation of furnishers will be tolerated. Below, each
area of recent concern is evaluated in light of potential express and implied preemption
challenges.
1. Employers’ Use of Credit Reports
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, at 2501 (2012) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
176 See, e.g. Ariz. v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2256 (2013);
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194, 173 L. Ed. 2d 51 (2009);
historic
Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543, 172 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2008);
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250, 135 L. Ed. 2d 700
(1996);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L. Ed. 1447
(1947).
177 See supra text accompanying notes 72 to 142.
178 A number of decisions have concluded that the preemption provision of 15
U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F), which preempts an state “requirement or prohibition . . .
with respect to any subject matter regulated under-- . . . section 1681s-2 of this
title, relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to
consumer reporting agencies” preempts a state law claim arising from a
furnisher’s furnishing of such information. See, e.g., Premium Mortg. Corp. v.
Equifax, Inc., 583 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 2009); Barberan v. Nationpoint, 706 F.
Supp. 2d 408, 426-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Aleshire v. Harris, 586 Fed. App’x
668, 671 (7th Cir. Oct. 15, 2013) (concluding that the plaintiff had forfeited her
argument, but reasoning that nonetheless the “argument is without merit
because state law tort claims are ‘requirement[s]’ for preemption purposes”)
(citation omitted).
175
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The FCRA contemplates that employers will use credit reports in selecting and
placing employees. It specifically designates employment purposes as permissible.179
While the act imposes slightly more onerous terms on employers than apply to, for
example, run-of-the-mill creditors that use credit reports,180 by and large it permits
employers as much access to an individual’s credit history as any other entity that can
claim a permissible purpose.
However, the express preemption doctrine would not block a state law that
prohibited employers from obtaining reports for employment purposes. None of the
FCRA’s express preemption provisions covers the Act’s permissible purposes provision,
the one that permits an employer to acquire a credit report for employment purposes.181
Absolutely nothing in the FCRA itself requires an employer to obtain a credit report;
accordingly an employer could meet the demands of both the FCRA and a state law
prohibiting employers from accessing credit reports simply by abiding by the state law.
Thus, implied impossibility preemption would not arise.
As for implied obstacle preemption, the recent Supreme Court decisions indicate a
deference to state schemes, so long as the area is not one in which Congress has
pervasively regulated.182 Given Wyeth v. Levine’s heavy reliance on the purpose
presumption, and the FCRA’s own express reservation of power to states, any state law
limiting employers (or other users) from acquiring credit reports would very likely clear
implied obstacle analysis.
2. Criminal Record Information
However, state statutes that prohibit consumer reporting agencies from including
certain types of state record information are more vulnerable to express preemption.
The restrictions described above prohibit specific users from asking for, acquiring, or
using credit information. An alternate method to regulate the trafficking of personal
information is to regulate the content of a consumer report rather than its acquisition.
In short, not “user, you cannot buy this,” but “agency, you cannot sell this.” This may
appear to be an unnecessarily fine distinction, but the FCRA’s express preemption
provisions render that distinction highly meaningful.
The FCRA has a content preemption provision183 that prevents states from regulating
the subject matter of section 1681c, identified as “relating to information contained in

15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(B).
The employer must notify the consumer that a consumer report may be
obtained for employment purposes and the consumer must authorize the
employer’s procurement of a consumer report. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(2)(A)(ii).
181 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
182 See supra text accompanying notes 117 to 142.
183 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(E).
179
180
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consumer reports”184 Criminal background information is content information, and
furthermore it is content information that section 1681c specifically accounts for by
designating some criminal record information as obsolete, and thus ineligible for
inclusion as a consumer report, after seven years.185 The question is whether a state law
more protective of such information than section 1681c, one that prohibits consumer
reporting agencies outright from placing criminal background information in consumer
reports, would be seen as relating to the subject matter of this section, in light of the
Supreme Court decisions construing the effects of express preemption provisions.
However, while the title of the section identified as preempting is broad –
“[r]equirements relating to information contained in consumer reports”186 – the actual
scope of the section is much narrower. It does not purport to regulate content as a
whole, but rather focuses on specific items of information that should be excluded
because the information is old. This section addresses criminal record information in
three ways. First, it provides that consumer reporting agencies may not, in general,
report arrest records (or other adverse criminal record information, aside from
convictions) that are more than seven years old.187 Second, agencies may nonetheless
report those arrest records where a credit transaction or life insurance underwriting is
for $150,000 or more, or where the report is to be used in connection with the
employment of someone who will received a salary of $75,0000 or more.188 Finally,
agencies may report all criminal convictions in perpetuity.189 In analyzing the power of
the obsolescence provisions to preempt, one court concluded that the FCRA’s
obsolescence provision preempted its parallel Colorado provision that prohibited
criminal convictions that were more than seven years old, reasoning that the state
provision was clearly of the same subject matter – the length of time an agency can
report a criminal conviction.190 This analysis evinces a broad reading of the section, one
not necessarily justified by its content, as discussed next.
However, the provision is less about the substantive character of the information and
15 U.S.C. § 1681c.
15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2).
186 15 U.S.C. § 1681c.
187 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2) (agencies may not report records more than seven
years old or after the governing statute of limitations has expired, whichever is
longer).
188 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(b)(1)-(3).
189 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(5) (exempting criminal conviction records from the
general rule that agencies may not report any adverse item of information more
than seven years old).
190 Simon v. Directv, Inc., 09CV00852PABKLM, 2010 WL 1452853, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar.
19, 2010) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge), adopted by
09CV00852PABKLM, 2010 WL 1452854 (D. Colo. Apr. 12, 2010).
184
185

22-Oct-15]

Preventing Preemption

37

much more about its age. The provision establishes that information is sufficiently
“fresh” only for the designated period of time, without governing the content itself. This
construction casts the provision as closely resembling the express preemption provision
analyzed in Altria, where the Supreme Court interpreted the preemption provision “[n]o
requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State
law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which
are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter”191 as applying only to state
laws based on smoking and health. Reading the span of section 1681t(b)(1)(E) as
reaching only the subject matter of state laws that address the obsolescence of criminal
record information would mean that under the reasoning of Altria, a broader statute,
like the Maine deceptive practices act involved in that case, would not be construed as
addressing the specific material that the preemption provision refers to. The Court
construed the state statute in Altria as imposing a general duty not to deceive, rather
than one that was more narrowly based on “smoking and health.” Here, the FCRA’s
content preemption provision could apply only to state laws regulating the time for
which an item with specified content could remain on a report, and not the initial
eligibility of the information to ever be included in a report. Nonetheless, arguably such
an analysis would be an inapt adaptation of Altria, given that the state statute there was
a broadly applicable anti-fraud statute, in contrast to the sort of content-specific state
credit report statute that states might consider to limit information placed in credit
reports. Proponents of a state ban on criminal record content might have to argue that
Altria should permit narrow state statutes where the coverage of the express
preemption provision was also commensurately narrower.
What’s more, section 1681c relates specifically to what consumer reporting agencies
can put into a consumer report; every subsection pertains to what an agency can and
cannot do.192 Nothing in the section pertains to what an employer can or cannot do.
Hence, one fair alternative to regulating the criminal record content of a consumer
report issued for employment purposes would be to tell employers that they may not
request a consumer report that includes such criminal record information, or that if an
employer receives a report containing such information, the employer may not use it.
This approach regulates users, rather than furnishers or agencies, and would create, in
essence, an anti-discrimination law. This is the approach taken by some states,
including California and Illinois, in recently enacting criminal history cloaking
provisions.193 In this way the restriction becomes a restriction on users of consumer
reports, not creators of consumer reports, and likely should fall outside the preemptive
effects of 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(E).
Under this, a constrained reading of the preemption provision that would comport
with the general rule that federal courts should so read such provisions, a state would be
15 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b) (West).
15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a).
193 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/10(a); see supra text
accompanying notes 40 to 49.
191
192
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permitted to prohibit criminal records on credit reports, so long as it did not address the
length of time that other categories of information could be reported by a consumer
reporting agency. In contrast, a state that sought to limit the window of time that a
criminal record – whether arrest, conviction, or other – could be reported would likely
be construed as intruding on the subject matter of the FCRA’s obsolescence provision
and thereby become preempted.
3. Medical debt restrictions
Using similar reasoning, states should be able to pass preemption-proof restrictions
on the placement of medical debt information in consumer reports. While states have
not yet acted in this area, the 112th Congress considered a bill that would have
prohibited consumer reporting agencies from putting medical debt in a credit report
could inspire states to do so.
Concerns over the privacy of medical information motivated Congress to add
protections to the FCRA when they revised the act in 1996. Congress limited the use of
medical information by creditors, insurers, and employers.194 It defined medical
information broadly, encompassing “information or data . . . that relates to (A) the past,
present, or future physical, mental, or behavioral health or condition of an individual . . .
.”195 The FCRA’s restrictions on the use of such information are more protective in the
case of employment use than in the case of an insurance transaction – for an insurance
transaction, the consumer need only consent to the furnishing of the medical
information.196 However, for reports issued for employment or credit transaction
purposes, the agency may include the consumer’s medical information in the report only
if the information is relevant to the transaction and the consumer has given “specific
written consent” for the report, consent that must “describe[] in clear and conspicuous
language the use for which the information will be furnished.”197
Two of the FCRA’s express preemption provisions may impact state regulation of
medical debt information in consumer reports, one relating to the content of reports and
one relating to the regulation of information furnishers. First, as discussed above, the
FCRA has an express preemption provision that prevents states from regulating the
subject matter of section 1681c, relating to the content of information contained in
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(g).
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(i).
196 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(g)(1)(A).
197 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(g)(1)(B). The act does permit agencies to include medical
information that “pertains solely to transactions, accounts, or balances relating to
debts arising from the receipt of medical services, products, or devises [sic]”
where the information is coded to avoid identifying the nature of the services,
products, or devices. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(g)(1)(C).
194
195
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consumer reports.198 However, in contrast to its treatment of criminal record content
information, discussed above, section 1681c says very little about medical information
content. The only reference to the medical industry pertains to a report’s inclusion of the
identifying information of any medical information furnisher; the FCRA requires
agencies to withhold such information unless it is coded to avoid disclosing the nature of
the provider and what it has provided.199
Accordingly, under the relatively state-friendly ruling of Altria, if the content
restriction of section 1681c were read to size itself down to the very specific and limited
content restriction contained within section 1681c, then a broader state law banning
medical debt would appear to address subject matter that differed from that in section
1681c, allowing a state law ban to survive express preemption under this theory. The
main restrictions on the inclusion of medical information in consumer reports are
located not in section 1681c, which is the target of an express preemption provision, but
in section 1681b(g), which is not.200 Accordingly, states should remain free to decide
what medical information content agencies may and may not put in reports, so long as
they do not put agencies in the position of being unable to comply with both the state
provision and the FCRA (which would lead to obstacle-impossibility preemption)201 or
act so broadly as to disrupt the purpose of the FCRA (which would lead to obstaclepurpose preemption).202
15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1)(E). See supra text accompanying note 159.
15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(6). Specifically, the name, address, and telephone number
of the medical information furnisher. Id. This restriction does not apply if the
agency is providing the report to an insurance company for something other than
property or casualty insurance – meaning the agency can provided non-coded
identifying information to an insurance company that wants the report for
medical, life, or other sort of insurance. The FCRA references medical
information in a number of other ways. First, in general, information that would
otherwise be a consumer report is not such if it meets the terms of the Act’s
affiliate sharing exemption. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(A). However, that exception
does not apply when affiliates share medical information. Id. at 1681d(3). In
addition, the FCRA imposes somewhat stricter requirements on reports
furnished for employment or credit purposes that contain medical information,
requiring that the information be relevant to the transaction and that the
consumer provide specific consent for the furnishing of the report. Id. at
1681c(g)(1), (3). Nonetheless, information about medical debts may be included
without those restrictions so long as the information is coded to obscure the
specific provider and the nature of the medical services, products, or devices
giving rise to the debt. Id. at § 1681c(g)(1)(C). So, as long as the agency codes the
information, it may place it in the report including the amount of the debt – that
amount, of course, being precisely what will harm the consumer’s credit rating.
200 Specifically, section 1681b(g)(1).
201 See supra text accompanying notes 125 to 136.
202 See supra text accompanying notes 137 to 142.
198
199
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Once such a state law has cleared preemption of the subject matter of the FCRA’s
content restriction provision, a state law limiting medical debt information in consumer
reports would then have to hurdle section 1681t(b)(1)(F), an express preemption
provision prohibiting states from regulating the subject matter of the FCRA’s main
furnisher-responsibilities provision. However, even this more specific subject matter
preemption provision in the FCRA should not impede states much. As discussed above,
this preemption provision provides merely that states may not regulate the subject
matter of, among other provisions, a provision that requires furnishers “whose primary
business is providing medical services, products, or devices” to notify the agency of their
status as medical information furnishers, a rather small, perfunctory provision.203 Thus,
given a narrow construction, this preempting provision forbids states from regulating
the subject matter of notifications by medical information furnishers to consumer
reporting agencies. This preempting provision is far narrower than that of the Medical
Device Amendment Act in Riegel, which preempted any state law beyond one that was
an identical twin to the federal law, leading the Court to conclude that it barred state
products liability claims.204 Furthermore, California’s Supreme Court has rejected giving
this preemption provision a broad reading that would extend to bar a claim under a
state medical privacy statute.205 Thus, such a state provision should clear express
preemption.
As for implied impossibility preemption, nothing would force an agency into having
to violate a state law forbidding the inclusion of medical debt in credit reports in order
to comply with the FCRA, because nothing in the FCRA requires an agency to include
medical debt in a consumer report. Accordingly, that doctrine would not nullify a state
effort to keep medical debt out of consumers’ credit reports.
As for implied obstacle preemption, a medical debt restriction would not be at direct
odds with the FCRA’s purposes, one of which is, ultimately, to protect consumers.206
Thus a state provision limiting the corrosive effects of involuntary expenditures for
medical services would be entirely consistent with that purpose. The FCRA’s proconsumer purpose contrasts distinctly with that of the federal motor carrier services law
15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F), incorporating 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(9).
See supra text accompanying notes 97 to 103.
205 Brown v. Mortensen, 51 Cal. 4th 1052, 1065 (Cal. 2011) (rejecting argument
that the FCRA barred a claim under California’s Confidentiality of Medical
Information Act that arose from a dentist’s sharing of the medical records of a
client and his sons, concluding that the state act targeted different subject matter
from that of section 1681s-2).
206 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4) (stating that “[t]here is a need to insure that
consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness,
impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy”).
203
204
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construed in Rowe and its purpose to have market forces, rather than state legislatures,
impose limits. That purpose conflicted with the youth-protecting purpose of the state
anti-tobacco law, and thus the state law fell.207 Therefore, a restriction on medical debt
would not become null under a theory of implied obstacle preemption.
In short, states likely have a fair amount of room to exclude medical debt from
consumer credit reports, and could use that room to help their citizens maintain the
confidentiality of their unanticipated or unaffordable medical expenses. Thus, states
that were concerned about the effects of medical debt on their citizens’ credit reports
could prohibit agencies from putting such debts into credit reports.
4. Identity theft provisions
However, states may be a good deal more hampered when it comes to protecting
their consumers from the crushing damage that can arise when an identity thief has
poisoned a consumer’s credit report with the thief’s own transactions. As described
above, New Mexico took the step of enacting a provision making it reasonably easy for a
consumer to block information arising from an identity thief’s debts.208 However, when
Congress added identity theft-prevention provisions to the FCRA, it also boosted the
preemption subsection to specifically address those provisions, staking out some
exclusive federal territory. The identity theft related provisions sheltered by an express
preemption provision include some duties imposed on furnishers,209 consumer
207
208

See supra text accompanying notes 104 to 112.
See supra text accompanying notes 62 to 65.

The following duties of furnishers relate to identity theft and are subject to a
preemption provision:
 Furnishers’ duties to “have in place reasonable procedures to respond to any
notification that it receives from a consumer reporting agency . . . relating to
information resulting from identity theft, to prevent that person from
refurnishing such blocked information.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(6)(A), subject
to 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F) (subject matter).
 Furnishers’ duties to refrain from furnishing information resulting from
identity theft, where the consumer has submitted an identity theft report to
the furnisher. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(6)(B), subject to 15 U.S.C. §
1681t(b)(1)(F) (subject matter). To trigger the duty, the consumer must have
submitted the report “at the address specified by [the furnisher] for receiving
such reports.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(B)(6). The furnisher may resume
reporting the information if it “subsequently knows or is informed by the
consumer that the information is correct.” Id.
209

One court has concluded, however, has upheld a state identity theft provision
against a preemption challenge that asserted that the provision was within the
“subject matter” regulated by section 1681s-2(a)(6), concluding that the state
action “concerns the direct relationship between the credit provider and the
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reporting agencies,210 the FTC and other federal agencies,211 businesses that transact
consumer,” rather than one that fell within the “subject matter” of a furnisher’s
reporting of credit information to a consumer reporting agency. Pasternak v.
Trans Union, C07-04980 MJJ, 2008 WL 928840, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2008).
210 The following duties of consumer reporting agencies are subject to a
preemption provision:
 Consumer reporting agencies’ duty to notify one who has requested a
consumer report that the address in the request “substantially differs
from the addresses in the file of the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(h). In
theory the subject matter of this provision is subject to preemption
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(E).
 Agencies’ duties to provide fraud alerts, extended fraud alerts, and active
duty alerts, and to refer alerts to other nationwide consumer reporting
agencies, and for resellers to reconvey alerts, and to provide consumers
with information on how to contact the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1.
 Agencies’ duties to block the reporting of identified theft-related
information from a consumer’s report, and to notify the information’s
furnisher of the block. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2. This provision is subject to the
conduct-required-by preemption provision of 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(5)(B).
This provision allows consumer reporting agencies to rescind or decline
the block under the following circumstances:
[T]he consumer reporting agency reasonably determines that –
(A) the information was blocked in error or a block was requested by the
consumer in error;
(B) the information was blocked, or a block was requested by the
consumer, on the basis of a material misrepresentation of fact by the
consumer relevant to the request to block; or
(C) the consumer obtained possession of goods, services, or money as a
result of the blocked transaction or transactions.
15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(c)(1).
 The duty of nationwide consumer reporting agencies to develop procedures
to refer identity theft complaints, fraud requests, and information block
requests to one another. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(f). The conduct required by this
subsection is subject to preemption pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(5)(G).
211 The following duties of federal agencies are covered by an express preemption
provision:
 The Federal Trade Commission’s duty to prepare a summary of rights of
identity theft victims, and consumer reporting agency’s duties to provide
consumers who complain of being the victim of fraud or identity theft with
the summary. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(d). States may not impose any
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with identity thieves,212 owners of debts resulting from identity thieves,213 and debt
collectors.214
The relevant FCRA provisions generally regulate furnishers and agencies.215
Furnishers must refrain from furnishing information resulting from identity theft, and
have procedures to respond to a notice from a consumer reporting agency notifications
that it has blocked such information.216 Agencies, in turn, must provide fraud alerts in
reports and block identity theft related information, among other duties.217
In assessing the relationship between state identity theft provisions and the FCRA, a
California district court dismissed a preemption challenge to a state identity theft
provision that authorized claims by identity theft victims against those who assert a
claim arising from identity theft,218 In an opinion that narrowly construed the “subject
matter” reach of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2, one of the provisions identified in the FCRA’s
subject matter preemption provisions.219 The court rejected the consumer reporting
agency’s arguments that two different provisions of section 1681s-2 that pertained to

requirement or prohibition “with respect to the disclosures required to be
made” by this subsection. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(3).
 The duty of designated federal agencies to draft red flag guidelines and
regulations. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(e). The conduct required by this subsection
is subject to preemption pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(5)(F).
212 The duty of businesses who have transacted with an identity thief to provide
to the victim information about the transaction or transactions. 15 U.S.C. §
1681g(e). The subject matter of this subsection is subject to preemption pursuant
to 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(G). Furthermore, states may not impose any
requirement or prohibition “with respect to the disclosures required to be made”
by this subsection. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(3).
213 The duty of owners of debts resulting from identity theft who have been
properly notified to not sell, transfer, or place for debt collection the debt. 15
U.S.C. § 1681m(f). The conduct required by this subsection is subject to
preemption pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(5)(F).
214 The duty of debt collectors who learn that the debts that they are attempting
to collect may be fraudulent or the result of identity theft to notify the person on
whose behalf the collector is acting about these qualities of the information, and
to provide certain information to the consumer upon request. 15 U.S.C. §
1681m(g). The conduct required by this subsection is subject to preemption
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(5)(F).
215 See supra text accompanying notes 209 to 210.
216 See supra text accompanying note 209.
217 See supra text accompanying note 210.
218 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.92.
219 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F); Pasternak v. Trans Union, C07-04980 MJJ, 2008 WL
928840, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2008).
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identity theft bore a subject matter that extended to the state provision, nullifying it.220
The court characterized the plaintiff’s action against the defendant, who sought to force
the plaintiff to pay the identity thief’s debt, as one that “concerns the direct relationship
between the credit provider and the consumer,” rather than one that fell within the
“subject matter” of a furnisher’s reporting of credit information to a credit reporting
agency.221 Thus, the court examined the specific subsections of the FCRA’s furnisher
obligations and carefully analyzed their content rather than simply concluding that the
preempting provision should be construed as covering any state claim against a
furnisher.222
In contrast, some courts have construed the subject matter preemption effect of the
FCRA’s provision regulating furnishers as broadly preempting any claim that relates to
furnisher behavior, without carefully examining the precise contours of the different
responsibilities identified within that section.223
220

Pasternak, 2008 WL 928840, at *4. One FCRA provision pertains to the duties

of furnishers upon an agency’s notice of identity theft and imposing on furnishers
a duty to refrain from refurnishing the disputed information, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s2(a)(6), while the other requires furnishers to take certain actions upon receiving
an identity theft complaint from a consumer, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(8).
221 2008 WL 928840, at *4.
222 For similar careful, though less detailed analysis, see Lichtenfels v. Crook,
CV065007438S, 2007 WL 2938716, at *6 (Conn. Super. Sept. 26, 2007) (dismissing state
law claims based on allegations of furnisher behavior that fell within section 1681s-2,
but retaining the others) and Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Lichtenfels,
CV044003402S, 2007 WL 2938730, at *1 (Conn. Super. Sept. 26, 2007) (same).
223 See, e.g., Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 888 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that the FCRA preempted a state provision requiring furnishers who receive
notice of a dispute to investigate and review relevant information); Sukiasyan v. OCS
Recovery Inc., CV 11-9622 GAF CWX, 2013 WL 490683, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2013)
(holding that a California statutory provision regulating furnishers that provide
negative credit information was preempted); Harrold v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., C
12-02987 WHA, 2012 WL 4097708, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2012) (concluding that
claims brought pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(b), (c), and (f), which impose
accuracy requirements on furnishers of information to credit reporting agencies, were
preempted by 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F)); Oganyan v. Square Two Fin., CV 11-10226
RGK VKB, 2012 WL 3656355, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) (holding that the section
1681t(b)(1)(F) preempted a California statutory provision regulating furnishers that
provide negative credit information, and also a provision regarding furnishers’
reinvestigations, which the court characterized as “fall[ing] within the general ambit” of
section 1681s-2); Subhani v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat. Ass'n, C 12-01857 WHA, 2012
WL 1980416, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2012) (concluding that claims brought against a
furnisher under a state statute that imposed parallel requirements to those of section
1681s-2(a)); Banga v. Allstate Ins. Co., CIVS081518LKKEFBPS, 2010 WL 1267841, at
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A different federal court has also indicated that the FCRA’s express preemption
provisions may bar a New Mexico law that overlaps the FCRA’s identity theft debt
blocking provision. The FCRA requires consumer reporting agencies to block the
reporting of identity theft debts that a consumer has properly identified as arising from
a thief’s work.224 The FCRA provision allows an agency to decline to block or rescind the
blocking if it “reasonably determines that one of three conditions was met – the
information was erroneously blocked, the consumer made a material misrepresentation
about the information blocked, or the consumer benefitted from the blocked
transaction.225 New Mexico’s overlapping provision appears to have the same general
intent as the FCRA’s blocking provision – that of protecting consumers from being
tarnished by debts that they did not create. However, the New Mexico provision is more
protective of identity theft victims, because it does not permit consumer reporting
agencies to evade their responsibilities to block identity theft related debt by engaging in
their own independent review of the block and thereafter unilaterally rescinding it.226
Rather, the New Mexico law permits an agency to lift the block only if the consumer
requests it or a court orders it.227
However, the FCRA expressly preempts state laws with respect to the conduct
required by the blocking provision.228 Accordingly, the main industry association for
consumer credit reporting, the Consumer Data Industry Association, sought to block
enforcement of the New Mexico provision.229 The district court dismissed the complaint
on the grounds that the CDIA could not establish standing and therefore the case was
nonjusticiable, but the Tenth Circuit reversed, concluding that the declaratory relief the

*5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010) (holding that the FCRA preempted a claim against a
furnisher brought under California’s unfair competition law to the extent that it was
predicated on violations of section 1681s-2(a) and (b)); Drew v. Equifax Info. Servs., C
07-00726 SI, 2007 WL 2028745, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2007) (holding that the FCRA
preempted a claim against a furnisher brought under a state statute with similarities to
section 1681s-2, though refusing to dismiss a state claim arising from a user’s conduct
rather than a furnisher’s); see also Wang v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 681 F. Supp. 2d
1143, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (construing California’s unfair competition law as imposing
a “requirement or prohibition” by prohibiting “’any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice); Howard v. Blue Ridge Bank, 371 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143-44
(N.D. Cal. 2005) (concluding that the 1681s-2 preemption provision precluded a claim
under California’s unfair competition law that sought to impose a remedy for a violation
of the FCRA’s provisions).
224 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2.
225 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(c)(1).
226 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56--3A-3.1(D), (E).
227 Id. at § 56-3A-3.1(E).
228 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(5)(C).
229 Consumer Data Indus. Ass’n v. King, 678 F.3d 898, 902-03 (10th Cir. 2012).

46

Preventing Preemption

[22-Oct-15

Draft – Please do not cite without permission

CDIA sought would sufficiently redress its injury.230 The court’s discussion of the
preemptive effects of the FCRA cause some concern. Rather than addressing the quite
narrow preemption provision that would apply, the court stated grandly that “[t]he
FCRA leaves no room for overlapping state regulations.” As discussed below, this
substantially misstates the text of the FCRA.231
Two points oppose a broad reading of these identity-theft related preemption
provisions. First, these specific preemption provisions should be construed in light of
the introductory command of the preemption section, that except as provided, the FCRA
does not “annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person . . . from complying with the laws of
any State . . . for the prevention or mitigation of identity theft, except to the extent that
those laws are inconsistent [with the Act], and then only to the extent of the
inconsistency.”232 This countervailing instruction indicates that preemption should be
limited to only such state statutes that overlap nearly edge to edge with one of the
identified FCRA provisions.
Furthermore, as discussed above, the Supreme Court has deferred to state legislation
that supports the purpose of the corresponding federal law. As an additional argument
against express preemption of the New Mexico identity theft provision, both the FCRA
provisions and the New Mexican provision have an intent of protecting consumers from
debts that they did not create; the difference is in the details, not the aim. Accordingly,
the reasoning of Rowe, where the pro-commerce aim of the federal statute differed from
and conflicted with the anti-tobacco aim of the state statute, can be meaningfully
distinguished. Thus, the New Mexico provision that was the subject of the Tenth
Circuit’s decision stepped too closely on the provisions of the identity theft blocking
provisions, specifically the circumstances under which a consumer reporting agency
could decline to block.
Nothing in the FCRA’s blocking provision requires a consumer reporting agency to
rescind a block based on its own determination that the block was placed in error.
Rather, the Act clearly states that an agency “may decline to block, or may rescind any
block” in the identified circumstances.233 Therefore, the absence of required conduct
leaves nothing for section 1681t(b)(5)(C) to preempt regarding the rescission (as
opposed to the placement of) a block. Second, the preemption provisions extend only to
the “conduct required by” the identified FCRA provisions, in contrast to the broader
“subject matter regulated under” relationship that applies to a clutch of other
preempting provisions.234
230
231

Id. at 902-03.
See infra text accompanying notes 232 to 234.

15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a) (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(c)(1).
234 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1), (5).
232
233
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However, if the New Mexican law is ultimately found to be preempted by the FCRA,
New Mexico, along with other states, could perhaps achieve its goal by painting with a
broader brush. The underlying problem with identity theft-related debt tainting a
consumer’s credit report is not the actual source of the debt, but the fact of its
inaccuracy. If a consumer reporting agency reported the debt of another person as
belonging to the targeted consumer, the effects on the consumer would be just the same
even though the mis-reported debt did not arise from identity theft, but merely from the
mixing up by the agency of the targeted consumer with the debt’s true creator. What’s at
issue is the accuracy of the information that the agency chooses to assign to any one
report. Accordingly, a state could mitigate the effects of identity theft by imposing
stricter accuracy requirements on consumer reporting agencies, or by enhancing the
penalties for inaccurate reporting, or both. While the FCRA does, in fact, impose certain
accuracy requirements on agencies,235 they impose nothing like strict attention to
accuracy. Accordingly, by requiring agencies to meaningfully assess the accuracy of
information initially, or to strictly verify it once it’s been disputed by a consumer, a state
could quite likely drastically reduce the pernicious effects of identity theft without
stepping on the toes of the FCRA, which does not explicitly preempt state laws imposing
accuracy on agencies, as opposed to furnishers.236
Another fruitful area for states to thwart identity theft is through mandating that
consumer reporting agencies impose security freezes on the files of consumers who
request them. These permit a consumer to hide their credit information from new
potential creditors237 while allowing the consumer to be able to explicitly “thaw” the
freeze for specific transactions. Several states have enacted such provisions and they can
effectively block an identity thief from co-opting a consumer’s credit record.238
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b), 1681i.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F), preempting states from regulating the subject
matter of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2, which imposes accuracy requirements on
furnishers.
237 In general, such freezes may not hide reports from existing creditors. See, e.g.,
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2MM(n) (providing that the freeze provisions do not
apply to entities that the consumer owes).
238 See, e.g. ALA. CODE §§ 8-35-1-8-35-3; ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.48.100-45.48.290;
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1698; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-112-101-4-112-114; CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 1785.11.2-1785.11.4, 1785.11.6; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-14.3106.6-12-14.3-106.9; CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36a-701-701a; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 §§
2201-2204; D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3861-28-3864; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
501.0050591.0051; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-913-10-1-915; HAW. REV. STAT. §§
489P-3-489P-6; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-52-101-28-52-109; 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
505/2MM; IND. CODE §§ 24-5-24-1-24-5-24-17; IOWA CODE §§ 714G.1-714G.11;
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-723-724; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 367.363-367.365; LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3571.1(H)-(Z), 3571.3; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1310;
MD. CODE ANN., Com. Law §§ 14-1212.1-14-1212.3; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, §§
235
236
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States seeking to legislate in identity theft area should avoid implied impossibility
preemption by ensuring that an agency, user, or furnisher can comply with both the
FCRA and the proposed state law. Furthermore, states should proactively anticipate
implied obstacle preemption arguments. Wyeth indicated a preference for consumer
remedies, and some of the FCRA’s identity theft provisions deny consumers a private
cause of action for the violation of identity theft specific provisions. For instance, the
FCRA allows consumers to obtain transaction information from businesses that have
been tricked by an identity thief into relying on the victim’s identity.239 However, the act
denies consumers a right to sue over a violation of that provision.240 Instead, only the
Federal Trade Commission and designated state officials may sue to enforce this
provision.241 A state law that provided a remedy could complement the FCRA,
promoting the Congressional preference for allowing consumers to have remedies that
the Rowe court noted.242 Now, quite possibly a defendant might argue that Congress’s
explicit carve-out of this section from the standard FCRA remedies provisions243
negated such a general preference in this specific context. However, one response might
be that while Congress did not intend to provide a federal remedy, and to have such
litigation in federal courts, given the anti-preemption language of section 1681t(a), along
with the fact that consumer protection is typically the province of state law,244 that
Congress preferred that states determine individually whether a remedy was
56, 62A, 63, 64; MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.2531-445.2535; MINN. STAT. §
13C.016-13C.019; MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-201-75-24-217; MO. REV. STAT. §§
407.1380-407.1385; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-1727-30-14-1736; NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 8-2601-8-2615; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 598C.300-598C.390; N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 359-B:22-359-B:29; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:11-46-56:11-49; N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 56-3A-2-56-3A-6; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 380-t; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-63;
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-33-01-51-33-14; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.52; OKLA.
STAT. tit. 24, §§ 149-159; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646A.606-646A.618; 73 PA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2501-2510; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§6-48-1-6-48-9; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-20-16037-20-161, 37-20-200; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-15-1-54-15-16; TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-18-2108-2109; TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §§ 20.031-20.039, 20.21-20.31; UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 13-45-202-13-45-205; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2480h-2480j; VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-441.1-59.1-444.3; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.182.170-19.182.210;
W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-6L-101-46A-6L-105; WIS. STAT. §§ 100.54-100.545; WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 40-12-501-40-12-509.
239 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(e).
240 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(e)(6).
241 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681g(e)(6), 1681s.
242 555 U.S. at 574.
243 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o.
244 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Abrams, 897 F.2d 34, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1990)
(“[b]ecause consumer protection law is a field traditionally regulated by the
states, compelling evidence of an intention to preempt is required in this area”).
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appropriate and whether that state wanted its courts to accommodate such claims,
filling that gap in the FCRA.
While the FCRA does preempt states from imposing any “requirement or prohibition
. . . with respect to any subject matter regulated under . . . section 1681i of this title,
relating to the time by which a consumer reporting agency must take any action,”245 that
could fairly be read narrowly, pursuant to the principles described above,246 to prevent a
state from requiring an agency to complete a reinvestigation of disputed information
before the end of the 30 day period that the section designates.247 Even were it
construed to read more broadly, to extend to any reinvestigation of accuracy standards,
states could still motivate consumer reporting agencies to be more accurate (and
thereby withhold identity theft related data) by imposing a stricter initial standard of
accuracy, or by enhancing the penalties available for inaccuracy, neither of which is
covered by the act’s express preemption provision.
Nor should such provisions, or any of the other kinds of legislative protections
described above, become preempted under either an impossibility or obstacle implicit
preemption analysis. Pursuant to PLIVA and Mutual Pharmaceutical, the standard for
impossibility preemption would require the regulated party to show that it could not
simultaneously comply with the federal and the state standard. But none of the
proposed courses of action would impose that kind of conflict.
To succeed in an implied obstacle preemption analysis, a regulated party would have
to show that Congress’s purpose sufficiently differed from that of the state that
complying with the state law would “stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”248 However, keep in mind
that the FCRA is, at its heart, a consumer protection statute, not a consumer reporting
agency industry protection statute nor a furnisher or user protection statute. Along with
the savings clause language,249 that consumer protection is an area traditionally left to
the states,250 and the ample room that the FCRA has left for states to regulate, the area
differs significantly from that of Rowe, where Congress sought to deregulate, rather
than regulate, to clear the table of restrictions on trucking whether they be federal or
state.
V. CONCLUSION

15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1).
See supra text accompanying notes 137 to 142.
247 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A), (B).
248 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
249 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a).
250 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Abrams, 897 F.2d 34, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[b]ecause
consumer protection law is a field traditionally regulated by the states, compelling
evidence of an intention to preempt is required in this area”).
245
246
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The Great Recession may have revealed to us the extent of the freight that attaches to
our identities, and the effect of that heft on our opportunities to gain or advance in jobs,
acquire credit, find a place to live, or insure our belongings. Those revelations have
motivated many state legislatures to adjust the balance between the legitimate interests
of those who investigate consumers and the privacy interests of consumers.
To be effective, though, state provisions must avoid preemption by the federal Fair
Credit Reporting Act. The breadth of those provisions turns not just on their words, but
the interpretation of those words given the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence.
Broad statutory enactments that impose general duties, such as state deceptive practices
act laws, may be less likely to fall victim to preemption. Furthermore, states can
strengthen the likelihood that their measures will succeed by aligning the statutory
purposes of their legislation with that of the federal act – ensuring the accuracy of
reports and promoting consumer protection. States will benefit from the Supreme
Court’s “purpose presumption,” which prefers to avoid preempting legislation in those
areas of states’ “historic police powers,”251 one of which is consumer protection.
Given this backdrop, the types of provisions most likely to succeed are those that
focus on the users of reports, forbidding them, for instance, from using a credit report
for certain circumstances, such as employment.
Limits on the content of consumer reports are more vulnerable to preemption, but
should survive so long as the FCRA’s content preemption provisions receive a justifiably
tight reading. Accordingly, states should be able to restrict consumer reporting agencies
from placing specific criminal record information in credit reports. However, state
regulation of identity-theft related debt will likely fall to the FCRA’s preemption
provisions, which give the federal act nearly a monopoly over such information.
Nonetheless, states could achieve the objectives sought by most identity-theft credit
report provisions by regulating in an area that the FCRA does not protect through its
preemption provisions, such as by tightening overall accuracy requirements imposed on
consumer reporting agencies.
States should evaluate the legitimate needs of employers, creditors, landlords, and
ascertain the level of access to consumers’ information that will both fulfill those needs
while cloaking those aspects of their citizens’ lives that individuals prefer to keep
private.

251

See supra text accompanying notes 121 to 124.

